The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section:  A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion by Galactos, Theodora
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 2 Article 6 
1995 
The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes 
Section: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over 
Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
Theodora Galactos 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Theodora Galactos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case 
Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 587 (1995). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case 
Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Cover Page Footnote 
Many individuals helped me improve upon my original work, and I would like to thank in particular 
Professor Bruce A. Green for his invaluable insights throughout the writing of this Note. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss2/6 
NOTES
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES SECTION: A CASE
STUDY OF INTER- AND INTRABRANCH CONFLICT
OVER CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE
EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Theodora Galacatos*
TABLE OF CoNTENrs
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 589
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMES SECrON ("ECS") ................................. 595
A. Overview of ECS History and the Enforcement of
Federal Environmental Crimes ........................ 595
1. Increased Criminalization of Environmental
Violations ......................................... 596
2. Intensified Targeting of Individual Corporate
Officers Who Violate Environmental Laws ........ 597
3. Additional Sanctions Imposed Against Federal
Environmental Crimes Violators .................. 598
B. Difficulty of Enforcing Environmental Laws .......... 599
1. Background on Prosecutive Authority ............. 599
2. Background on Challenges of Prosecuting
Environmental Crimes ............................. 600
C. Backdrop to the Relationship Between Congress and
the Executive Branch Concerning Environmental
Policy ................................................. 602
1. Congressional Investigatory Prerogatives Versus
Executive Privilege of Confidentiality ............. 604
2. Description of Committee Oversight System ...... 608
3. Congressional Committee Oversight of Federal
Environmental Policy: The Gorsuch Burford
Case ............................................... 609
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ECS CoNRovERsy .................. 612
A. 1992: The Thrley Preliminary Report ................. 613
1. The Turley Preliminary Report's Conclusions
Regarding its Six Case Studies .................... 614
2. The Turley Preliminary Report's Conclusions
Regarding ECS Management and Administration
* Many individuals helped me improve upon my original work, and I would like
to thank in particular Professor Bruce A. Green for his invaluable insights throughout
the writing of this Note.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of the Environmental Criminal Enforcement
Program ........................................... 616
3. Responses to the Turley Preliminary Report ....... 616
B. 1992-93: The Congressional Subcommittee Hearings 617
C. 1993-94: The Department of Justice Internal Review 619
1. Summary of Internal Review's Overview of ECS's
Program ........................................... 620
2. Summary of Recommendations of Internal
R eview ............................................. 621
D. The Bluesheet Controversy: Case Oversight and
Allocation of Decision Making Between United States
Attorneys Offices and ECS ............................ 622
1. Case Procedures Prior to the 1993 Bluesheet
Changes ........................................... 623
2. Case Procedures Subsequent to the 1993
Bluesheet .......................................... 624
3. Case Procedures Adopted by the Clinton
Administration .................................... 625
E. The Resignation of Neil Cartusciello ................... 626
F. Short-Term Resolution of ECS Conflict with
Congress .............................................. 627
G. The ECS out of the Spotlight. The Aftermath of the
ECS Controversy ...................................... 627
III. INTERBRANCH CONFLICT OVER CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF THE ECS .................................. 628
A. The Executive Doctrine of Congressional Oversight of
the E CS ............................................... 628
1. DOJ Officials' Resistance to Congressional
Oversight of Prosecutorial Decision Making ....... 629
2. Commentaries Critical of Congressional Oversight
of Prosecutorial Decision Making ................. 631
3. The Independent, Apolitical Prosecutor: The
Executive's Ideal .................................. 633
B. Congressional Doctrine of its Investigative Prerogative
over ECS's Enforcement Record ....................... 634
1. Congressional Interpretation of Supreme Court
Precedent Regarding Congressional Oversight of
Law Enforcement ................................. 635
2. Congressional Perspective: The Threat of a
Politicized and/or Compromised DOJ ............. 636
C. The Need for Interbranch Accommodation and
Political Compromise .................................. 637
IV. INTER- AND INTRABRANCH DIFFERENCES OVER
ALLOCATION OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-MAKING
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ........... 641
A. Background on Prosecutive Authority ................. 641
[Vol. 64
ECS CASE STUDY
1. Internal and External Constraints that Restrict the
Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion ................. 643
2. Proponents of the Status Quo ..................... 644
a. External Controls .............................. 645
b. Internal Controls ............................... 645
3. Proponents for Change ............................ 646
a. External Controls .............................. 647
b. Internal Controls ............................... 647
B. Congressional and Executive Preferences Regarding the
Centralization of Prosecutorial Authority over Federal
Environmental Crimes ................................. 648
1. Centralized Models ................................ 648
2. Decentralized Models ............................. 649
3. Congressional and Executive Perspectives on
Centralization of Prosecutorial Authority in the
Enforcement of Environmental Laws During the
ECS Controversy .................................. 650
V. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY
OVER ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES ........................... 652
A. The Rearticulated Problem Underlying the ECS
Controversy ........................................... 652
B. Suggested Criteria for Evaluating Models for
Congressional Oversight of and Executive Branch
Exercise of Prosecutorial Decision Making ............ 653
C. Alternative Models Available for Interbranch and
Intrabranch Oversight of ECS Prosecutorial Decision
M aking ................................................ 654
D. Evaluation of the Four Models of Prosecutorial
D iscretion ............................................. 655
1. Analysis of the First Model ........................ 655
2. Analysis of the Second Model ..................... 657
3. Analysis of the Third Model ...................... 658
4. Analysis of the Fourth Model ..................... 658
5. Recommended Dynamic Model ................... 658
CONCLUSION ................................................... 659
INTRODUCTION
From 1992 to 1994, internal discord and scathing public criticism
derailed the federal environmental criminal enforcement program and
rendered it in "utter disarray."1 During this period, the Department
1. Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules
and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 Loy. LA. L Rev. 867, 871 (1994)
[hereinafter Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime]; see also id at 875-91 (re-
viewing the recent history of the federal enforcement efforts for protection of the
environment and arguing that implementing federal criminal sanctions into a system
of civil and administrative regulations presents significant challenges).
1995]
590 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
of Justice ("DOJ") Environmental Crimes Section ("ECS" or "Sec-
tion") was embroiled in a high profile controversy regarding its en-
forcement of federal environmental criminal law. Some critics
charged that, under the Bush administration, the ECS became "a po-
litically 'compromised' section with easy access for industry and polit-
ical figures." A number of congressional committees held hearings to
investigate the Section,4 and the national media covered the issue ex-
tensively.5 In addition, several ECS prosecutors, who opposed the
Section's leadership and policies, divulged internal case-specific infor-
mation to non-DOJ individuals.6 Finally, the ECS imbroglio came to
2. According to the United States Attorneys' Manual, the DOJ established the
Environmental Crimes Unit ("Unit") to enforce federal environmental crimes in
1982. The Department upgraded the Unit on April 24, 1987, to the Environmental
Crimes Section. United States Department of Justice, 4 Department of Justice Manual
(P-H) § 5-11.001 (Supp. 1990) (commonly referred to as the United States Attorneys'
Manual or USAM) [hereinafter USAM]. The Section is comprised of a staff of spe-
cialized attorneys. Its mandate charges it with carrying out the enforcement of federal
criminal laws for the protection of the environment. Id. § 5-11.002. See discussion
infra part I (providing a fuller description of the Section's history and mandate).
3. Jonathan Turley, The Environmental Crimes Project, The National Law
Center, The George Washington University, Preliminary Report on Criminal Envi-
ronmental Prosecutions by the United States Department of Justice for The Honora-
ble Charles E. Schumer, Member of Congress, Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime
and Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Represent-
atives 30 (Oct. 19, 1992) [hereinafter Turley, Preliminary Report] (study commis-
sioned by Rep. Charles E. Schumer, a Democrat from New York, and conducted by
law professor Jonathan Turley, Director of the George Washington University Envi-
ronmental Crimes Project) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also Enforce-
ment: Report Alleges Justice Department Failure to Prosecute Environmental Crimes
Vigorously, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 1710, 1711 (1992) (reporting the Preliminary Report's
recommendation for hearings concerning federal prosecutions of environmental
crimes); Jonathan Turley, Free the Rocky Flats 23, Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1993, at A19
(charging the ECS in op-ed editorial with lax enforcement of federal environmental
crimes against corporations and corporate officials).
4. See, e.g., EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Hearing 1993] (conducting hearings to
investigate the ECS controversy); EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Hearing 1992] (same).
5. See, e.g., Bryan Abas, Dingell's Justice Probe Is Justified, Wall St. J., July 22,
1993, at A15 (editorial); General Dingell, Wall St. J., July 8, 1993, at A12 (editorial);
Mark C. Hansen, Smear at Justice, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1994, at A21 (op-ed); Justice
Department Top Environmental Lawyer Quits Amid Controversy, L. A. Tines, Apr. 2,
1994, at A16; Jim McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers Under Reno,
Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1994, at A25 [hereinafter McGee, Environmental Crimes Contro-
versy Lingers]; US Attorneys Called Frustrated in Effort on Environment Crime, Bos-
ton Globe, Nov. 4, 1993, at 28.
6. William J. Corcoran, et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Internal Review of the De-
partment of Justice Environmental Crimes Program app. E (Mar. 10, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter Corcoran, Internal Review]; see also Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting Rep.
Dingell as stating that the subcommittee's investigation had been "assisted immeasur-
ably by the cooperation of many line attorneys and U.S. attorneys whose interviews
have been key"); Technopolitics, Reuter Transcript Report, Dec. 4, 1992, at 6, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File (citing an environmental law commentator
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plague the Clinton administration and Attorney General Janet Reno
as well.7
The ECS dispute presents issues of prosecutorial and environmental
policy.8 The controversy also implicates federal governance concerns.
as stating that he served as a "confidential conduit" for line prosecutors to pass their
criticisms and concerns to Congress).
7. McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers, supra note 5, at A25.
The controversy between congressional subcommittees and the Section continued
into the new administration. See id. This account reported low morale and flagging
efforts to improve management within the Section. See id. (describing the relations
between DOJ and local United States Attorneys Offices as impaired by "bad blood");
see also Reno Blindsided by Angry ECS Line Attorneys, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 9, at 6
(May 16,1994) (describing acrimonious and tense meeting between Attorney General
Reno and ECS prosecutors, particularly members of a faction loyal to the last ECS
director under the Bush administration).
8. Regarding prosecutorial policy in the environmental arena, for example, the
controversy raises two types of questions about charging decisions: (1) substantively,
which legal doctrines shape the criteria that govern decisions to prosecute federal
environmental crimes; and (2) procedurally, how prosecutorial discretion gets allo-
cated within the DOJ. This Note examines the latter concern only and considers how
the prosecutive decision-making process regarding federal environmental crimes may
be improved. (The Note uses the terms "prosecutorial" and "prosecutive" synony-
mously. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1820 (1986) (defining
"prosecutive" as "of or relating to prosecution").) The substantive and procedural
concerns implicated by the ECS controversy, however, present inextricably inter-
twined issues, which can not easily be disentangled or analyzed separately. Moreover,
the fact that the field of environmental law is a quarter of a century old-and, thus,
newly emerging and constantly evolving-informs any analysis of the substantive and
procedural issues related to the ECS's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Laza-
rus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 890-91.
Regarding substantive legal issues, for example, Congress passed the first federal
environmental laws in the 1970s. Id. at 875-77. Criminal sanctions became part of the
federal government's overall environmental protection strategy to protect the envi-
ronment as recently as the mid-1980s. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
As a result of the environmental law's recent development, courts are still grappling
with key environmental legal doctrines. See e.g., Brenda S. Hustis & John Y. Go-
tanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25
Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 169 (1994).
Regarding procedural decisionmaking concerns, federal government attorneys also
contend with unsettled prosecutorial guidelines for environmental cases. See, e.g., Jo-
seph G. Block, Good First Step or Hidden Dagger? The Effect of Voluntary Disclo-
sure on DOJ Prosecutorial Discretion, C776 ALI-ABA 103 (1992) [hereinafter Block,
Good First Step]; Vincent J. Marella, The Department of Justice Prosecutive Guide-
lines in Environmental Cases Involving Voluntary Disclosure-A Leap Fonvard or a
Leap of Faith?, 29 Am. J. Cim. L. 1179 (1992); Thomas L. Weisenbeck & Ritaelena
M. Casavechia, Guidelines for Prosecution of Environmental Violations: The Tension
Between Self-Reporting and Self-Auditing, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2481 (1992). In fact,
DOS issued prosecutorial guidelines related to environmental crimes as recently as
July 1991. USAM, supra note 2, § 5.11.301A (Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prose-
cutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compli-
ance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator). Even these guidelines, however, discuss
prosecutorial criteria solely from the point of view of the ECS's voluntary disclosure
program. Id.; see, e.g., Weisenbeck & Casavechia, supra, at 2482 (suggesting that the
guidelines "put the regulated community on notice" and seek compliance with federal
environmental laws through voluntary "disclosure" and the "remedying [of]
violations").
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For example, as described below, the ECS affair precipitated an inter-
branch conflict between the legislative and executive branches over
the enforcement of federal environmental crimes. The ECS matter
also sparked a controversy, within the DOJ and between the executive
and legislative branches, over the exercise of prosecutorial authority
in this area.
First, this case study examines the interbranch conflict that arose
when Congress sought-and the DOJ resisted-investigation into the
ECS's enforcement record. In particular, three representatives ex-
amined allegations that ECS improperly declined to prosecute federal
environmental crimes.9 In March 1994, congressional oversight of
ECS culminated in a highly unusual development: a subcommittee
tried to compel ECS prosecutors to be interviewed regarding specific
declination decisions 0 and subpoenaed internal DOJ documents."
Commentators criticized such congressional information gathering as
improperly intrusive. These observers argued that the Constitution's
separation of powers limits the manner in which Congress may moni-
tor executive branch departments-in particular a law enforcement
entity such as the ECS.' In addition, the American Bar Association
("ABA") Criminal Justice Section drafted a resolution calling for re-
9. The representatives include former Rep. Howard Wolpe, a Democrat from
Michigan, see Sharon LaFraniere, Crimes at Nuclear Plant "Downplayed": Hill Re-
port Assails Justice Department Failure to Indict Rocky Flats Workers, Wash. Post, Jan.
5, 1993, at A5; Rep. Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New York, see Enforcement:
Report Alleges Justice Department Failure to Prosecute Environmental Crimes Vigor-
ously, supra note 3, at 1710; and Rep. John D. Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan,
see McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers, supra note 5, at A25.
10. The term "declination decision" refers to a decision by a prosecutor to forgo
criminal prosecution of a target. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
supra note 8, at 586 (defining "declination" as a "formal refusal" or
"nonacceptance").
11. H. Josef Hebert, House Panel Subpoenas Documents from Justice Department,
AP, Mar. 11, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 10145262, at *1; Jim McGee,
House Panel Subpoenas Justice: Documents Sought on Environmental Crimes Cases,
Policy Change, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1994, at A4 [hereinafter McGee, House Panel
Subpoenas Justice]; see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
12. Bruce Fein, Dingell's Dubious Fandango, Wash. Tumes, Oct. 13, 1993, at A17
(maintaining that the DOJ enjoys a constitutional privilege with regard to its
prosecutorial deliberations); General Dingell, supra note 5, at A12 (arguing that re-
fusal to turn over DOJ materials to congressional committee was proper and "rooted
in the Constitution's separation of powers"); Stuart Gerson, The Legislative Politiciza-
tion of the U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Backgrounder, Nov. 18, 1994, at 1 (stating
that "[t]hese efforts [by congressional oversight committees] pose a long-term consti-
tutional threat by impinging upon the core, judicially-unreviewable, [e]xecutive
[b]ranch function of rendering independent [prosecutorial] decisions"); Hansen, supra
note 5, at A21 (characterizing Rep. Dingell's criticism of the ECS as a "fine display of
modern-day McCarthyism," which has "breached the wall between branches of gov-
ernment"). But see Abas, supra note 5, at A15 (suggesting the challenge of carrying
out properly the difficult but necessary obligation of congressional oversight with re-
spect to the DOJ).
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straints on congressional oversight of criminal prosecutors.13 The
ECS affair, thus, gave rise to an extended dispute between congres-
sional oversight committees and the DOJ.
Second, this Note examines an intrabranch concern: the case study
considers DOJ's interest in allocating prosecutorial decision making
between Main Justice 4 and local United States Attorneys Offices
("USAOs"). a5 Centralization of prosecutive authority over federal
environmental crimes generated extensive controversy within the
DOJ and in Congress as well. This Note explores the contrasting per-
spectives held within the DOJ and Congress regarding the assignment
of prosecutorial decision-making authority over environmental crimes
in Main Justice. In addition, this Note contends that such centraliza-
tion affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation's environ-
mental enforcement efforts.
Finally, this Note posits that the threat of improper partisanship
constituted a critical element of the ECS affair. Political tensions un-
derlay the interbranch conflict over congressional investigation into
federal environmental prosecutions. Similarly, fear of partisan influ-
ence fueled the controversy over the exercise of the ECS's
13. ABA to Weigh Congressional Oversight Limits, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 13, at 4
(July 18, 1994). The ABA, however, eventually bowed to pressure from five House
committee chairmen and withdrew its proposal to limit Congress's power to question
prosecutors. Congressional Witnesses, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 15, at 10 (Aug. 15,
1994).
14. This Note uses the term "Main Justice" to refer to the DOJ's six major litiga-
tion divisions, which are comprised of sections and are located in Washington, D.C.
Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 30 & n.10 (stating that the Antitrust, Civil,
Civil Rights, Criminal, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions
(under the supervision of the assistant attorneys general) comprise the Department
along with the offices of the deputy attorney general, the associate attorney general,
and the solicitor general). By contrast, the U.S. Attorneys-located in the U.S. At-
torneys Offices-assume "'front-line' responsibility for conducting" the federal gov-
ernment's litigation. Id. at 33 (asserting that the U.S. attorneys "serve[ ] as the chief
law enforcement officer in [their] judicial district[s] and [are] responsible for coordi-
nating federal agency investigations within [those] district[s]").
15. Policies and procedures related to prosecutorial authority reflect the aims and
strategies of the federal government's environmental protection program. For exam-
ple, centralizing prosecutorial discretion presents advantages and drawbacks that dif-
fer from those created by decentralizing prosecutorial decision making. See Hebert,
supra note 11, at *2; Jim McGee, Environmental Prosecutions Decentralized, Wash.
Post, Aug. 26,1994, at A23. See discussion infra part IV.B (detailing congressional and
executive branch preferences regarding the centralization of prosecutorial authority
over federal environmental crimes). In addition, whether the agency develops
prosecutorial guidelines and, if so, whether it decides to publish them further affects
federal environmental protection efforts. See Lazarus, Problem with Environmental
Crime, supra note 1, at 884 (asserting that a vacuum of settled prosecution criteria
hamper enforcement of environmental crimes and that the DOJ should establish
prosecutorial guidelines). But see William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an
Instrument of Reform, 54 Ohio St. LJ. 1325, 1363-73 (1993) (analyzing the controls
exerted on prosecutorial discretion and detailing the disadvantages posed by making
public prosecutorial guidelines).
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prosecutorial authority. This Note asserts that partisanship-and the
inefficiencies it spawns in federal governance-can best be checked
through the principled self-restraint of executive and legislative offi-
cials. The Note is comprised of five parts. The first part provides an
overview of the history of the Section and of federal environmental
enforcement efforts. It describes the backdrop to the ECS contro-
versy, especially the Section's relationship with such key players as
Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA"), and lo-
cal USAOs. Part II chronicles the details and timeline of the ECS
conflict. Parts III and IV analyze the two tensions inherent in the
dispute: first, interbranch disagreements over information sharing, in
particular regarding law enforcement matters; and, second, intra- and
interbranch differences over the degree to which prosecutorial deci-
sion-making authority over federal environmental crimes ought to be
either centralized in Main Justice or decentralized and meted out to
the USAOs. Part V evaluates four alternative models of intrabranch
and interbranch oversight of prosecutorial discretion in the federal
criminal environmental program.
This Note concludes first that Congress can legitimately oversee
how the DOJ allocates prosecutorial power and the extent to which it
maintains control over federal enforcement of environmental crimes.
Congressional investigations into individual prosecutive decisions,
however, should occur only when ample evidence reveals egregious
breaches of prosecutorial ethics on the part of federal prosecutors.
Only self-disciplined congressional oversight of prosecutorial discre-
tion will effectively ensure that the DOJ carries out its legislative man-
date in the environmental arena. This Note reaches a second
conclusion that, as environmental doctrines become settled law and
USAOs gain expertise in successfully enforcing federal environmental
laws, the DOJ should decentralize prosecutive decision making. The
DOJ, however, should not seek blanket and immediate decentraliza-
tion of prosecutorial discretion from Main Justice to USAOs. The de-
gree and rate of decentralization of prosecutive decision making
requires a sophisticated analysis of regional needs, local USAOs' ca-
pabilities, and federal policy concerns, all of which the DOJ should
continually reassess. Finally, this Note offers an analytic model for
evaluating how restricted versus liberal congressional oversight over
the ECS combines with centralized versus decentralized prosecutorial
authority over federal environmental crimes to affect the nation's en-
vironmental program. The framework explores the tensions and
trade-offs inherent in the administration of the ECS's mandate-be-
tween accountability and autonomy, and among effectiveness, effi-
ciency, and equity. Striking a correct balance will permit the ECS to
accomplish its central responsibility: enforcing the nation's environ-
mental laws as fairly and successfully as possible.
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMES SEcrION
An understanding of the ECS dispute requires an overview of the
nation's criminal environmental protection program and, in particular,
Congress's role in monitoring progress in this area. To that end, this
part summarizes federal environmental protection efforts, which his-
torically have been hampered by bureaucratic barriers and the diffi-
culties inherent in integrating environmental criminal sanctions into a
system of predominantly civil and administrative penalties. Deep par-
tisan and philosophic differences over goals and policy-within Con-
gress and between Congress and executive agencies-have further
stymied the environmental protection program.1 6 This part concludes
by examining the continually expanding congressional oversight of
federal environmental policy in light of Congress's often adversarial
relationship with the EPA and the ECS.
A. Overview of ECS History and the Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Crimes
The ECS is a subdivision within the Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division ("Environment Division") of the DOJ. 17 According
to the United States Attorneys' Manual ("USAM"), the purpose of the
ECS is to "provide a specialized legal staff capable of carrying out the
effective enforcement of federal criminal laws relating to protection of
the environment.""8 Some of the duties of ECS attorneys include con-
ducting all phases of criminal litigation when the ECS has lead respon-
sibility for a case, cooperating with United States attorneys when
USAOs have lead responsibility for a case, and monitoring all prose-
cutions of federal environmental crimes to assure consistency of statu-
tory interpretation and enforcement policy.19 Congress has
16. See Lazarus, Problems with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 876 (sug-
gesting that Congress and executive agencies have exhibited "philosophic" differences
over their views on environmental policy); see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool
Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal Environmental Criminal
Law, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 251, 252-53 (1993) (describing the radically different
approaches to federal environmental criminal law that have emerged).
17. USAM, supra note 2, § 5-1.00. Congress created the Division in 1909 to repre-
sent the federal government in cases involving environmental quality, public lands
and natural resources, Indian lands and native claims, and wildlife and fishery re-
sources. The Division's mandate calls for enforcement of criminal and civil regula-
tions. In addition, the Division litigates all cases investigated by the EPA. Id. §§ 5-
1.00 to 5-1.200.
18. ld. § 5-11.002 (Supp. 1990-91). Assistant Attorney General Lois J. Schiffer, in
testimony before Congress, stated that "[t]he Environmental Crimes Section evalu-
ates, investigates, supervises, prosecutes, and monitors criminal cases related to the
control and abatement of pollution." Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 1995 WL 274071, at *3 (F.D.C.H. May 10,
1995) (statement of Lois J. Schiffer, Ass't Att'y Gen., Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
19. USAM, supra note 2, § 5-11.002 (Supp. 1990-91).
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authorized the ECS to initiate criminal cases pursuant to seventeen
federal statutes.2" The Section, however, initiates the majority of en-
vironmental criminal cases under four of the seventeen federal stat-
utes:21 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 2
the Clean Water Act, 3 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),24 and the Clean Air
Act.25
The 1980s comprised a decade of explosive growth in federal en-
forcement of criminal environmental laws. 6 During this watershed
period, Congress intensified federal enforcement efforts directed at
environmental crimes. The subparts below summarize how Congress
enacted stiffer penalties for environmental violations, authorized the
prosecution of individual corporate officers responsible for such
wrongs, and broadened the type and severity of sanctions that courts
can impose on felons.
1. Increased Criminalization of Environmental Violations
In the mid-1980s, Congress enhanced federal protection of the envi-
ronment by reclassifying violations of numerous environmental regu-
20. Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to Holders of United States
Attorneys' Manual Title 5, at 9-10 (Aug. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Revised Bluesheet] (on
file with the Fordham Law Review). Congress first enacted federal pollution control
statutes after World War II, and expanded these laws dramatically after 1970. Corco-
ran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 7. The federal and state governments jointly
administer the extensive regulatory scheme, which has evolved since the 1970s. Id.
Due to their complexity, federal environmental laws present significant enforcement
difficulties, especially with regard to uniform interpretation and application. Id. The
legal standard set out by federal environmental criminal laws defines criminal culpa-
bility as "'knowingly' endangering persons from pollution discharges" or as know-
ingly violating "statutory or regulatory requirements." Id.
21. See John S. Simmons et al., Federal Environmental Crimes, 4 S.C. Law. 11, *1
(June 1993) (stating that the "primary environmental criminal statutes" enforced by
the ECS include RCRA, CERCLA, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988) (specifying criminal penalties under the
RCRA).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988) (providing for criminal penalties under the
Clean Water Act).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988) (establishing criminal penalties under the
CERCLA).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988) (allowing for criminal penalties for violations of
the Clean Air Act).
26. Joseph G. Block, Environmental Criminal Enforcement in the 1990's, 3 Viii.
Envtl. LJ. 33, 34 (1992) [hereinafter Block, Environmental Criminal Enforcement]
(describing the rapid growth of the federal criminal environmental protection pro-
gram). See generally Roger W. Findley, Perspectives on a Legal Revolution, 27 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 779 (1994) (commenting on the history and future of environmental
regulation); Thomas J. Kelly, Jr. & Nancy A. Voisin, Enforcement Trends, C776 ALI-
ABA 21, 23-29 (1992) (reviewing recent developments in environmental criminal en-
forcement); Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 869-71
(summarizing recent federal efforts to protect the environment through criminal
prosecutions).
[Vol. 64
ECS CASE STUDY
latory provisions as felonies.27 In particular, Congress added criminal
sanctions, such as fines and incarceration, to the four most frequently
enforced environmental statutes: RCRA, CERCLA, the Clean Water
Act, and the Clean Air Act.' These legislative changes, along with
slowly expanding appropriations, resulted in dramatic increases in the
number of prosecutions for environmental crimes.29 As criminal envi-
ronmental enforcement expanded during the decade, so too did the
Section's resources and scope of authority.30
2. Intensified Targeting of Individual Corporate Officers Who
Violate Environmental Laws
In 1980, former Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti announced
plans to emphasize individual accountability in the enforcement of en-
vironmental crimes.31 This new strategy shifted the ECS's focus: in
addition to the prosecution of corporations, the ECS would now tar-
get high-level corporate officers involved in criminal wrongdoing as
well.32 Reformers believed that corporate liability alone failed to de-
27. Simmons, supra note 21, at *1. For example, Congress added new environ-
mental crimes to existing statutes such as RCRA and the Clean Water and Clean Air
Acts. Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 870 & n.7 (citing
the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 312,101 Stat. 7,42-45 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988)), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3007, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6927(b)(2) (West 1983)), and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L No.
101-549, §§ 101, 113(c)(5), 104 Stat. 2399, 2675-77 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d),
7413))).
28. Kelly & Voison, supra note 26, at 24; Simmons, supra note 21, at *1-3.
29. Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 870. For exam-
ple, between fiscal years 1983 and 1993, DOJ indicted 911 corporations and individu-
als for environmental crimes; convicted 686 violators; and assessed over S212 million
in criminal fines. Id.
30. The federal government established the ECS as a three-attorney Unit in 1982,
and upgraded it to a Section in 1987. See supra note 2. By 1992, the ECS employed 28
attorneys. Kelly & Voisin, supra note 26, at 24. In 1994, the Clinton administration
asked Congress for a 15% increase in funding for the Environmental Division that
will add at least nine attorneys to the ECS, and increase its staff productivity levels to
a projected 33 workyears in 1995. 1995 DOJ Budget" Across-the-Board Hikes Ex-
pected at ENR, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 6, at 8 (Apr. 4, 1994).
31. Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Tunes at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environ-
mental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 900,
904 (1991). Mr. Starr served as Director of the Unit starting in October, 1982. Corco-
ran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 60. Following Attorney General Edwin Meese's
decision to upgrade the Unit to a Section in April, 1987, Mr. Starr served as Chief of
the ECS until his resignation in September, 1988. liL at 65, 69.
32. Simmons, supra note 21, at *4 (stating that the DOJ's "[p]riority rests in iden-
tifying and charging the individuals responsible for the offense rather than simply
prosecuting the entity involved"); see also USAM § 5-11.311 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
USAM 1988] (stating that "Congress has demonstrated its intent that individuals, as
well as corporations, should be criminally prosecuted for violations of federal envi-
ronmental laws" and "[t]hat Congressional intent should be given serious considera-
tion in the development of prosecutions for violations [of federal criminal statutes]")
(on file with the Fordham Law Review). In order to effect this policy shift, former
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ter environmental crimes sufficiently, but that the threat of incarcera-
tion of individual offenders would compel compliance more
effectively.33
3. Additional Sanctions Imposed Against Federal Environmental
Law Violators
In addition to targeting responsible corporate officers, Congress
also made available a number of other sanctions to make the sting of
conviction more painful. Penalties today include "listing," which in-
volves banning companies convicted of violations from contracting
with the government until they comply with federal standards, 3 as
well as imposing stiffer fines. 35 Additionally, the new Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), adopted in November 1987, make
longer sentences mandatory for perpetrators of environmental
crimes.36 The Guidelines also abolish parole, strongly disfavor sus-
pended sentences, and require judges to adhere to strict minimum
sentencing schedules.37
In sum, federal prosecution of environmental crimes has gained mo-
mentum since the mid-1980s. The DOJ prosecutes all offenders more
aggressively-individual corporate officers as well as corporations. In
Attorney General Civiletti ordered a restructuring within the Lands Division and cre-
ated two new sections. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 58; Starr, supra
note 31, at 904. Mr. Civiletti charged the first, the Environmental Enforcement Sec-
tion ("EES"), with bringing suits to enforce environmental laws and the second, the
Environmental Defense Section ("EDS"), with defending suits brought against the
federal government under environmental statutes. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra
note 6, at 58-59 (discussing both EES and EDS); Starr, supra note 31, at 904 (discuss-
ing only EES).
33. Block, Environmental Criminal Enforcement, supra note 26, at 35; Starr, supra
note 31, at 901.
34. The EPA frequently resorts to the sanction of "listing." Kelly & Voisin, supra
note 26, at 34. For example, under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, the
EPA automatically "lists" violators convicted of environmental crimes. Block, Envi-
ronmental Criminal Enforcement, supra note 26, at 38. As a general rule, the EPA
limits sanctions to facilities (within a particular company) guilty of environmental of-
fenses. Kelly & Voisin, supra note 26, at 35. The EPA, however, can suspend or bar
entire companies, found to be in violation of federal environmental laws, from gov-
ernment contracting. Id.
35. Block, Environmental Criminal Enforcement, supra note 26, at 38. For exam-
ple, the DOJ recently assessed record fines against two corporate violators. In 1992,
DOJ negotiated a settlement with Rockwell International that required Rockwell to
pay $18.5 million in fines for infractions of federal environmental criminal laws. Mar-
garet K. Minister, Federal Facilities and the Deterrence Failure of Environmental Laws:
The Case for Criminal Prosecution of Federal Employees, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 137,
137 (1994). In 1991, as a result of the Exxon oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
the federal government required that Exxon pay $25 million in fines for criminal mis-
demeanors and $100 millon to restore the area. In addition, Exxon agreed to pay $1
billion in civil fines. Block, Environmental Criminal Enforcement, supra note 26, at
37-38.
36. Kelly & Voisin, supra note 26, at 27-28.
37. Id. at 28.
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addition, the number of investigations and convictions continue to
climb as Congress devotes ever greater resources to the EPA and the
ECS. Finally, federal environmental laws punish criminal violators
with harsher penalties than ever before. Nonetheless, as the subpart
below notes, numerous obstacles have hindered federal efforts to bol-
ster and expand the environmental protection program.
B. Difficulty of Enforcing Environmental Laws
Commentators have noted that, despite gains, federal environmen-
tal protection efforts have encountered multiple barriers to implemen-
tation,38 and have almost always fallen short of congressional
mandates.39 This subpart first describes briefly the scope and nature
of prosecutorial discretion and, secondly, explains some of the chal-
lenges prosecutors typically confront when enforcing federal environ-
mental laws.
1. Background on Prosecutive Authority
The United States system affords prosecutors broad prosecutorial
discretion because, prior to trial, the prosecutor must decide: (1)
which crimes to prosecute and against which groups or individuals; (2)
when to investigate; (3) whether to charge; (4) whether to divert the
potential defendant from the criminal system to civil proceedings; and
(5) whether to plea bargain or dismiss charges.4 Prosecutors consider
a wide variety of factors when making charging determinations.41 Un-
38. Starr, supra note 31, at 901-02.
39. Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 882-83; Schroe-
der, supra note 16, at 251-52.
40. Leland E. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Devel-
opment of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 310, 317 (1978); James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L Rev. 1521, 1523 (1981).
Prosecutorial discretion can also be viewed as entailing three analyses: (1) what evi-
dentiary standard should be met in order to institute criminal charges; (2) what non-
evidentiary considerations may justify a negative charging decision; and, (3) if a posi-
tive charging decision is made, what charges should be filed. Norm Maleng, Charging
and Sentencing, 1987 A.B.A. Sec. Crim. Just. 42.
41. One commentator enumerated the following list of factors that federal prose-
cuting attorneys tend to consider: (1) is there sufficient evidence proving the defend-
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) did the defendant demonstrate criminal
intent; (3) what course of action does the investigating agency recommend; (4) how
strongly does the victim agency support criminal prosecution; (5) what loss did the
defendant's violation inflict on the victim agency; (6) does the case present novel is-
sues of law;, (7) does the public strongly desire an airing of the charges; (8) what is the
risk that there will be an acquittal; (9) does prosecuting the defendant have deter-
rence value; (10) will the judge deem the defendant's actions egregious; (11) what
punishment is likely to be imposed; (12) will civil proceedings suffice; (13) does the
case present opportunities for criminal forfeitures; (14) has the court ever considered
a similar case; (15) is a congressional committee interested in this case; (16) does the
case present substantial public interest concerns; (17) does the defendant have a tena-
ble defense; (18) is the defendant in a position to further the overall investigation; and
(19) is the defendant in a position to assist in another more serious matter. Edward
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doubtedly, the decision whether to charge at all has the most serious
consequences, as it affects prospective defendants in substantial
ways.42 While the prosecutor enjoys broad powers, she does not exer-
cise completely unfettered discretion.43 Courts review prosecutorial
decisions that implicate constitutional rights. The most common cases
reviewed include selective prosecution, which denies equal protection
under the law, and vindictive prosecution, which violates due process
guarantees. 44 Courts, however, cannot review decisions not to prose-
cute; thus, prosecutors possess ultimate discretion with respect to dec-
lination decisions.
The exercise of prosecutive authority, thus, demands that prosecu-
tors undertake a sophisticated analysis, whereby they weigh multiple
factors. As indicated below, however, environmental law, due to its
complexity and recent development, presents an even greater chal-
lenge to federal prosecutors.46
2. Background on Challenges of Prosecuting
Environmental Crimes
Enforcement of federal criminal environmental laws provides a
wide array of challenges to DOJ prosecutors at Main Justice and
USAOs as well as EPA personnel. First, federal enforcement of envi-
ronmental crimes involves a number of agencies, including at a mini-
mum the EPA, the DOJ, both at Main Justice and at USAOs, as well
as state and local environmental protection agencies and prosecuting
S.G. Dennis, Jr., Prosecutorial Discretion: The Federal Government's Charging Deci-
sion, C900 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 463, 468 (Jan. 1994); see also Maleng, supra note 40, at 42
(describing factors that prosecutors consider in making charging decisions).
42. Beck, supra note 40, at 318; Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to
Charge a Suspect with a Crime 3 (1969); Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1525-26. For
example, charging decisions will impose a hardship of anxiety, cost and embarrass-
ment on the potential defendant. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1525.
43. Pamela Cothran et al., Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Pro-
cedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 Geo. L.J.
771, 773 (1994).
44. Id. at 774; Maleng, supra note 40, at 8.
45. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831. The Supreme Court stated
that:
[It] has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal pro-
cess, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.
This recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part
to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse
enforcement.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 884
(stating that the executive branch has failed to provide "specific guidance governing
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the environmental crimes area"); see also id.
at 888 (discussing the "existing vacuum of settled prosecution criteria").
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authorities.4 7 Second, long-standing strained relations characterize
the institutional links among many of the agencies involved in envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement. Tensions persist between the DOJ
and the EPA, among the DOJ, Main Justice and local USAOs, within
the DOJ, and between central and regional EPA offices. The
prosecutorial function of the DOJ and the investigatory role of the
EPA result in a high degree of interdependence that creates friction
when the two agencies differ regarding their enforcement agendas.
The relationship between the DOJ and the EPA thus raises a particu-
larly important concern4 9
Third, the federal environmental protection program initially in-
volved almost exclusively civil and administrative sanctions. Federal
efforts to introduce criminal sanctions into the existing noncriminal
regulatory scheme have encountered significant impediments.5 Staff-
ing patterns have prevented a smooth assimilation of the criminal en-
forcement program into the preexisting system. For example, one
commentator has noted that the EPA's legal and scientific staff rarely
have the training necessary to develop criminal cases effectively.51 As
a result, the EPA staff has a history of making premature referrals to
the DOJ of prospective criminal cases. The DOJ, in turn, has re--
47. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 6. In addition, regarding the fed-
eral environmental protection program, Congress has empowered the DOJ to enforce
both federal civil and criminal environmental provisions. I& at 32-33.
48. Se4 e.g., id. at 11-17; Lazarus, Problems With Environmental Crime, supra
note 1, at 876-77; Starr, supra note 31, at 902. Historically, since the inception of
environmental law during the early 1970s, the fragmented nature of environmental
policy as well as sustained partisan differences over policy goals have fueled inter-
branch feuding, especially between the DOJ and the EPA. Lazarus, Problems With
Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 876. For example, environmental law presents
a regulatory quagmire for practitioners, EPA investigators, and DOJ enforcers, and
also frequently implicates constitutional, corporate, insurance, and securities law is-
sues. Id at 867.
During the 1980s, several factors reinforced intrabranch tensions. First, when the
DOJ stepped up its enforcement of environmental crimes, it failed to clarify the re-
spective roles of the USAOs and Main Justice. This oversight led to inevitable clashes
as the Main Justice's Environment Division had grown accustomed to exercising
broad control over environmental cases and the USAOs had grown accustomed to
exercising broad discretion over criminal cases. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note
6, at 96. Second, the Environment Division's top officials set policy, not by develop-
ing general principles, but by becoming personally involved with individual cases. I
at 96-97. Finally, the Section, USAOs, and the EPA "all lacked experience in investi-
gating and prosecuting environmental crimes." Id at 97. This inexperience frequently
engendered opposing views on the manner and types of cases to pursue. Id.
More recently, between 1987 and 1989, changes in the Land Division's leadership
and ever shifting supervisory personnel in the ECS further exacerbated tensions
within the Section, as well as between the ECS and USAOs and between the ECS and
the EPA. I at 66-67.
49. Starr, supra note 31, at 904-05. Historically, EPA officials have faulted the
DOJ for not aggressively prosecuting violators. See id at 905.
50. Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 867-68.
51. Starr, supra note 32, at 907.
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sponded with a remarkably high rate of declination decisions." This
pattern has reinforced criticisms by some commentators, as well as
EPA personnel, that the DOJ has failed to prosecute vigorously fed-
eral environmental crimes."
In addition, one commentator has identified stark differences in ap-
proach between "environmental" versus "criminal" government law-
yers that may further exacerbate tensions between the two groups. 4
For example, at the EPA, a broad array of staff comprised of scien-
tists, administrators, and attorneys help resolve primarily scientific
disputes.55 By contrast, criminal prosecutions demand a limited
number of decision makers to determine whether the available evi-
dence sufficiently exceeds the legal "reasonable doubt" standard and
warrants conviction.56
C. Backdrop to the Relationship Between Congress and the
Executive Branch Concerning Environmental Policy
A critical facet to the ECS debacle involved the protracted struggle
between the executive and legislative branches over ECS's enforce-
ment of environmental crimes. The ECS dispute reveals long-stand-
ing and recurring differences between Congress and the executive
branch regarding their obligations to share information with one an-
other.57 In the ECS dispute, Congress requested two types of infor-
52. Id. The fact that the EPA pressures investigators to refer as many cases as
possible also contributes to the poor quality of EPA criminal referrals to the DOJ.
Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 148. The development of new investiga-
tive guidelines, which the EPA issued on January 12, 1994, as well as efforts to provide
training for and upgrade the skills of EPA investigators will hopefully lead to better
criminal referrals and improve coordination between the DOJ and the EPA. Id. at
150.
53. See, e.g., Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 874-75,
885 (noting that fragmented decision-making authority between the EPA and the
DOJ, and between investigators and prosecutors, invites disagreements and contro-
versy); Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 5 (referring to ECS's "pronounced
failure to prosecute environmental crimes to the same degree as conventional
crimes"). For example, 60% of the EPA's criminal referrals to the DOJ during fiscal
years 1979 through 1981 were declined. Starr, supra note 31, at 907 (citing EPA's Law
Enforcement Authority, 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 92
(1983) (testimony of F. Henry Habicht, II, Ass't Att'y Gen., Lands Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice)).
54. See Starr, supra note 31, at 914.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Steven Shimberg, Checks and Balance: Limitations on the Power of Con-
gressional Oversight, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 241, 242 (noting a
"'marked lack of consensus' between the executive and legislative branches concern-
ing the proper direction of federal environmental policy"). See generally Richard J.
Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet
Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Autumn 1991, at 205 [hereinafter Lazarus, Neglected Question] (conducting a
history and in-depth analysis of problems related to congressional oversight of the
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mation. Representative John Dingell subpoenaed memoranda from
staff attorneys to politically appointed high ranking officials for use in
the subcommittee's investigation of the ECS.5 8 In addition, Represen-
tative Dingell sought to interview career government attorneys re-
garding ECS declination decisions.59
Historically, the executive branch has resisted intrusive congres-
sional oversight by invoking a general executive privilege.6° Similarly,
under the Bush administration, the DOJ opposed subcommittee in-
vestigations into its operations on the grounds that prosecutorial deci-
sions ought not to be influenced by political considerations. 61 After
the presidential election, however, the Clinton administration agreed
EPA); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Con-
gressional Demands for Information, 44 Admin. L Rev. 197 (1992) [hereinafter
Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge] (reviewing tensions between Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch regarding the former's demands for information); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 Admin. L Rev. 1
(1994) (advocating for a reduction in secrecy and micromanagement by the legislative
and executive branches in connection with the oversight of regulatory policy).
58. McGee, House Panel Subpoenas Justice, supra note 11, at A4 (stating that Rep.
Dingell's House subcommittee served subpoenas on the DOJ for "internal documents
... concerning six cases... [that are the] subject of extensive investigation" and
"documents relating to a change of policy in the [USAM]").
59. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 90. The Internal Review recounted
this request as follows:
On September 23, 1992, the Subcommittee requested that its staff have the
opportunity to interview 14 Justice Department career attorneys, their su-
pervisors and others. See Letter from [Former] Chairman Dingell to [For-
mer] Attorney General Barr (Sept. 23, 1992). On June 2, 1993, the
Subcommittee requested copies of various related documents. Letter from
[Former] Chairman Dingell to [Former] Associate Attorney General Hub-
bell (June 2, 1993). The Justice Department agreed to cooperate with those
requests, subject to certain limitations. See Letter from [Former] Associate
Attorney General Hubbell to [Former] Chairman Dingell (June 17, 1993);
Letter from [Former] Associate Attorney General Hubbell to [Former]
Chairman Dingell (June 22, 1993).
Id. Associate Attorney General Hubbell expressed concern about intrusive oversight
of prosecutors when he testified before the Energy and Commerce Committee. Mr.
Hubbell stated that, when warranted, line attorneys ought to make declination deci-
sions freely without having to "worr[y] about ... explain[ing] the reasons." Hearing
1993, supra note 4, at 212.
60. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 226-27. Cf. supra note 59
(testimony of former Assoc. Att'y Gen. Hubbell expressing concern regarding con-
gressional oversight of the DOJ); infra note 61 (noting comments by former ECS
Chief Cartusciello expressing similar concerns).
61. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, 2 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 10, at 6,
*9 (Oct. 1992). In an interview, ECS Chief Cartusciello explained the rationale be-
hind opposing aggressive congressional oversight of the DOJ: "[P]eople will be afraid
to state their views because they will be called in front of Congress, and pilloried in a
hearing in which they have no opportunity to respond. That's why we don't want to
discuss internal deliberations." Id.
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to allow the congressional subcommittee to interview line attorneys62
and review internal documents.63
This subpart analyzes an important aspect of the ECS controversy:
the confrontation between congressional action (e.g., requests for in-
formation) and asserted executive privilege. More specifically, the
subpart will examine (1) the scope of congressional investigative
power into actions taken by the executive branch, (2) that power's
vehicle, the congressional subcommittee system, and (3) congressional
oversight of the federal environmental protection program.
1. Congressional Investigatory Prerogatives Versus Executive
Privilege of Confidentiality
Congressional oversight of the executive branch serves important
political and constitutional purposes. Investigation furthers such legis-
lative ends as enacting laws, monitoring the administration of pro-
grams, informing the public, and safeguarding Congress's institutional
integrity, reputation, and privileges.' 4 By evaluating the effectiveness
of federal legislation and the need for remedial action on a continuous
basis, Congress ensures greater accountability to its constituents.65
Moreover, congressional oversight may curb unbridled executive
power.66 Executive privilege, however, provides a countermeasure
that protects against excessive congressional oversight. The Supreme
Court has recognized as constitutionally based the invocation of both
legislative investigatory authority and executive privilege to maintain
the confidentiality of intrabranch communications. 67
The Supreme Court, in 1927, first addressed the constitutionality of
Congress's investigative power in McGrain v. Daugherty.68 There, the
62. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. The term "line attorneys" refers to
front-line prosecutors who try cases for the DOJ.
63. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
64. The 1992-93 Staff of the Legislative Research Bureau, An Overview of Con-
gressional Investigation of the Executive: Procedures, Devices, and Limitations of
Congressional Investigative Power, 1 Syracuse J. Legis. & Pol'y 1, *1 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Legislative Research Bureau Report]; see also Shapiro, supra note 57, at 2-3 (sug-
gesting that congressional oversight of regulatory agencies has traditionally played a
role in U.S. politics); Ronald L. Claveloux, Note, The Conflict Between Executive
Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 Duke L.J.
1333, 1339 (describing the political and constitutional purposes of congressional
oversight).
65. See Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1339.
66. Id.
67. Legislative Research Bureau Report, supra note 64, at *1; see also Morton
Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627, 671-78 (1989) (asserting that Congress possesses a constitu-
tional prerogative to inform itself, which derives from its legislative powers under
Article I).
68. 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927); see also Legislative Research Bureau Report, supra
note 64, at *2.
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Supreme Court found information gathering to be incidental to the
legislative function69 and held Congress's subpoena power over indi-
viduals to be constitutional.7 ° The case involved Attorney General
Harry M. Daugherty's refusal to appear before the Senate.7 The Sen-
ate was investigating allegations that the Attorney General failed to
enforce federal antitrust statutes and prosecute suspected violators
properly.72 The McGrain Court recognized Congress's power to com-
pel testimony of private individuals before a committee, and con-
cluded that "the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."'74 Else-
where, the Supreme Court has characterized congressional oversight
authority as "broad"7 5 and has suggested, in dicta, that congressional
oversight authority extends to monitoring of the executive branch.76
69. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 174.
70. Id. at 180 (concluding that "the witness wrongfully refused to appear and tes-
tify before the [Senate] committee... [and] that the Senate [was] entitled to have him
give testimony pertinent to the inquiry").
71. Id. at 152-53.
72. Id. at 151-52. The Court stated that the Senate sought to investigate:
the alleged failure of [Mr. Daugherty] to prosecute properly violators of the
Sherman Anti-trust Act and the Clayton Act against monopolies and unlaw-
ful restraint of trade; the alleged neglect and failure of [Mr. Daugherty] to
arrest and prosecute [suspected violators] and their co-conspirators in de-
frauding the Government, as well as the alleged neglect and failure of the
said Attorney General to arrest and prosecute many others for violations of
Federal statutes, and his alleged failure to prosecute properly, efficiently,
and promptly, and to defend, all manner of civil and criminal actions
wherein the Government of the United States is interested as a party plain-
tiff or defendant.
Id. (referring to the Senate's resolution authorizing an investigative committee).
73. Id. 160-61 (stating that "power to secure needed information by [subpoena]
has long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate").
74. Id. at 174.
75. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) ("The power of the Con-
gress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is
broad.").
76. Id. The Supreme Court described Congress's authority to investigate as
follows:
It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects
in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the
Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.
Id. (emphasis added). Lower federal courts have also, on occasion, opined on Con-
gress's constitutional grant of authority to investigate and, especially, on the commit-
tee system it has spawned. City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1026
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[O]ur separation of powers makes ... informal cooperation [be-
tween the executive branch and congressional committees] much more necessary than
it would be in a pure system of parliamentary government."). The Federal Circuit
noted that congressional oversight distinguishes our federal government:
We take notice that since early in the 19th Century there have been marked
differences between the United States Congress and other parliamentary
bodies. One is the greater development of the committee system here ....
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Moreover, commentators theorize that congressional investigations
enjoy a strong presumption of valid legislative purpose.77
Individuals' constitutional rights78 and concerns about separation of
powers,79 however, narrow the scope of Congress's investigative au-
thority. In particular, the executive privilege limits Congress's power
to monitor the executive branch.80 The Supreme Court first recog-
nized a presumptive, but not absolute, executive privilege in 1974 in
United States v. Nixon.8 The Nixon Court, however, expressly de-
clined to address the question of whether executive privilege super-
sedes congressional investigative prerogative.2
Officials in the executive branch have to take these committees into account
and keep them informed [and] respond to their inquiries....
Id. at 1025-26.
77. Legislative Research Bureau Report, supra note 64, at *4 (explaining that
"[the] presumption is based on the theory that Congress generally acts within its pow-
ers"). So long as the committee has jurisdiction over a subject matter, the courts will
deem the inquiry to be part of the legislative process and presume a legitimate pur-
pose-regardless of the motives of individual committee members. Id. at *5.
78. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. The Watkins Court cautioned that:
There is no [congressional] general authority to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress....
Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions
of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of
the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandize-
ment of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible.
Id. at 187; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) ("[T]he Con-
gress. . . must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution
on governmental action, more particularly . . . the . . . limitations of the Bill of
Rights.").
79. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111-12. In this instance the Supreme Court wrote:
Since Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may poten-
tially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within
the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government....
[It cannot] supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the
Executive.
Id.
80. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1342-43.
81. 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (recognizing a "presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications"). The Nixon Court explained that "[t]he privilege is fundamental to
the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution." Id The Court, however, then held that the specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial trumped the generalized assertion of presidential
privilege. Id at 713.
82. 418 U.S. at 712 n.19 (stating that "[w]e are not here concerned with the bal-
ance between the President's generalized interest in confidentiality ... and congres-
sional demands for information"); see also Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and
Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against
Congress, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 461, 471 (1987) [hereinafter Shane, Executive Privilege
Claims Against Congress] (stating that the Supreme Court has not yet adjudicated an
executive privilege dispute involving Congress). But see Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 454 (1977) (stating that "claims of Presidential privilege
clearly must yield to the important congressional purposes of preserving [executive
branch] materials and maintaining access to them").
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Disputes between the legislative and executive branches over infor-
mation tend to be rare but dramatic.'s Such controversies ignite in the
midst of long-standing, smoldering interbranch tensions!' The politi-
cally sensitive issues that frequently underlie these explosive contro-
versies create high stakes and engender deep partisan differencesas
Political observers and academics have both described and despaired
at interbranch tensions and the committee system they have
spawned.86 For example, as part of the "Contract with America,"
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, along with the Republican class
of 1994, pledged to overhaul the congressional committee system,
which critics consider to be unwieldy.Y Although previous Con-
gresses sought similar institutional improvements, none made signifi-
cant progressYm
Reform of congressional committees will require striking an appro-
priate balance of power among the branches, in particular between
executive privilege and congressional oversight.89 Thus, realignment
of congressional oversight authority presents a formidable task and
raises serious policy"' and constitutional91 concerns. The subparts be-
83. Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving
a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands
Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 Cath. U. L, Rev. 71, 78 (1986) (characterizing,
for example, the interbranch confrontation during EPA Administrator Gorsuch Bur-
ford's tenure as "dramatic"); Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress,
supra note 82, at 463 (describing interbranch confrontations as infrequent).
84. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1334 (noting "the historical tension between con-
gressional oversight and executive privilege").
85. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 463
(maintaining that "executive privilege disputes are most likely to occur over matters
that involve especially significant subjects of governmental decision making, or mat-
ters that are especially sensitive politically, or both").
86. See, e.g., Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 226-31 (theorizing that
excessive congressional oversight highlights agency shortcomings unfairly and erodes
public confidence, hampers Congress's ability to make timely amendments and ad-
justments to environmental laws, chills agency innovation, and drives up the costs of
government); Shapiro, supra note 57, at 1-2 (arguing that intensified oversight by the
legislative and executive branches has reduced political accountability and implicitly
suggesting that this development has augmented the agency costs associated with reg-
ulatory agency administration).
87. First, Congress, heal thyself, Miami Herald, Jan. 4, 1995, at 16A (stating that
"[oif the many promises that new House Speaker Newt Gingrich has made, the most
sensible is his pledge to change the way the House conducts its business[," in particu-
lar by advocating for the "reduction in the number of House subcommittees"); see
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 236.
89. See, eg., Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at
541-42 (concluding that "both Congress and the executive branch should be en-
couraged to crystallize their respective understandings of the scope of executive privi-
lege into what each branch will regard as controlling legal doctrine within that
branch").
90. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 235-36.
91. Id.
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low describe the congressional oversight system and focus, in particu-
lar, on congressional oversight of federal environmental policy.
2. Description of Committee Oversight System
Congressional oversight first became significant earlier in the twen-
tieth century with the advent of large federal agencies. 92 Congres-
sional committees formally assumed the responsibility to ensure
federal agency compliance with statutory mandates under the Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1946.93 In the 1970s, Congress reinforced
the committee system by authorizing increases in congressional com-
mittee staff, and directing committees to issue reports on their over-
sight activities. 94
Congress has historically employed a "fire alarm" approach to mon-
itoring executive branch operations; by contrast, the White House has
pursued a more systematic "police patrol" of its agencies. 95 The for-
mer depends on third parties to call attention to issues such as institu-
tional shortfalls, program defects, and political scandal; the latter
requires methodical audits, investigations, reporting, and other forms
of direct oversight.96 The "police patrol," while an effective strategy
92. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 207. Of course, the DOJ pre-
dated the emergence of federal agencies. Congress, however, did not formally estab-
lish the DOJ until 1870, although it created the positions of attorney general and the
equivalent of the U.S. attorneys (called "district attorneys") in 1789. Corcoran, Inter-
nal Review, supra note 6, at 27-29. Moreover, Congress did not initially vest the attor-
ney general with supervisory power over the district attorneys. Id. at 27. In fact, the
supervisory structure over the district attorneys remained uncertain until 1870 with
the passage of the so-called Department of Justice Act. Id. at 29; see also Susan Low
Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the
Beginning there was Pragmatism, 1989 Duke L.J. 561, 566-90, 571 (providing a history
of the office of the attorney general, which reveals that "[it] was ... less closely
aligned with the [p]resident than it is today"); Stephanie AJ. Dangel, Note, Is Prose-
cution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 Yale
L.J. 1069, 1071-75, 1082-88, 1088 (1990) (marshalling evidence showing that the
"Framers intended that Congress would influence, but not conduct, prosecution" and
that "the Framers did not view prosecution as a core executive, or presidential,
function").
93. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 207 & n.9 (Legislative Reorgan-
ization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 832 (1946) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190(e) (1982))).
94. ld. at 208. Congressional committee oversight grew markedly during the dec-
ade from a total of 9.1% of days devoted to hearings and meetings in 1971 to 25.2% in
1983. Id.
95. Shapiro, supra note 57, at 9-10. Under the "fire alarm" method, once
monitors become aware of problems, they often flare into full-fledged crises that at-
tract media coverage and call for immediate responses. By contrast, the "police pa-
trol" approach entails systematic monitoring that seeks to identify nascent problems
at all levels of government prior to escalating into a scandal. See id. at 7, 9 & n.59
(citing Joel Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Over-
sight 132 (1990) and Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165
(1984)); see also Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 220-21 (discussing the
role of the media in congressional oversight of federal agencies).
96. Shapiro, supra note 57, at 7.
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for gathering information, requires the control of agency administra-
tion possessed by the president.97 Congress, thus, has lacked the insti-
tutional advantages available to the executive branch to engage in
extensive "police patrol" of executive agencies. 98 Instead, Congress
supplements its necessarily limited "police patrol" oversight with the
"fire alarm" response, which, while less labor-intensive, provides am-
ple political pay-offs." As with the ECS dispute, members of the me-
dia, interest groups, and even disgruntled officials within
government 00 bring allegations of agency misfeasance and nonfea-
sance to the attention of congressional committees, whose members
benefit from press coverage of their efforts to investigate the claims. 0 1
3. Congressional Committee Oversight of Federal Environmental
Policy: The Gorsuch Burford Case
Executive agencies routinely satisfy congressional requests for in-
formation.1°2 Instances of interbranch strife most commonly arise
over topics rife with political tensions and partisan differences, such as
environmental policy.'0 3 Since its inception, the EPA has clashed bit-
terly with congressional committees over demands for documents and
testimony.1°4
97. Id. at 5 (stating that, despite congressional expansion of oversight mechanisms,
the president continues to hold important advantages over Congress in this area).
98. Id. at 5-6; see also Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 221 n.88
(stating that "committees are increasingly relying on police patrol oversight" as they
acquire the expanded staff necessary for this "resource-intensive endeavor").
99. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 221; Shapiro, supra note 57, at
9-10.
100. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 220-21; see also Corcoran, Inter-
nal Review, supra note 6, at 95-96 & n.133 (discussing, for example, an anonymous
memorandum written apparently by a government attorney, which expressed highly
critical views of Main Justice's environmental enforcement policies); Turley, Prelimi-
nary Report, supra note 3, at 3,5 (noting that the Report, which was commissioned by
a congressional subcommittee, interviewed ECS and EPA personnel and Assistant
United States Attorneys ("AUSAs") on a confidential basis).
101. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 221.
102. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 200.
103. Id. at 221.
104. See Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 214, 217 n.65. During the
first decades of the EPA, Congress condemned the EPA for both neglect and over-
reaching, and criticized the agency's record on a wide variety of legislative goals. Id. at
216.
According to Professor Lazarus, Congress has subjected the EPA to more intensive
and intrusive oversight than any other agency. Id at 206. Professor Lazarus also hy-
pothesized that because the scope of EPA's environmental protection agenda encom-
passes a wide variety of interest groups, the demand for congressional oversight has
grown dramatically. Id. at 211. In 1991, approximately 20 standing congressional
committees and almost 100 of their subcommittees shared jurisdiction over the EPA.
IM. The EPA testified before Congress more times, between 1971 and 1988, than any
other federal agency. Id at 212. Interestingly, Professor Lazarus's study of the EPA
and Congress reveals that the House Committee on Energy and Commerce has re-
quested that the EPA present testimony more frequently than any other House Com-
mittee. See id. at 213.
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Probably the most notorious controversy between the EPA and
Congress involved EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford during
the first term of the Reagan presidency in 1982.105 Like the recent
ECS dispute, the Gorsuch Burford scandal put Representative Dingell
and congressional oversight committees on center stage. °6 The con-
flict erupted when Gorsuch Burford refused to turn over documents
related to the EPA's administration of the Superfund program, which
sought to clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites.' ° In the fall of
1982, two subcommittees served subpoenas on Gorsuch Burford de-
manding both testimony and documents.' 08 The two subcommittees
were investigating allegations of impropriety, including lax enforce-
ment of federal environmental laws'09 and the influence of political
considerations in the administration of programs." 0
The Reagan administration reacted strongly and strenuously re-
sisted the production of the requested materials."' Executive branch
officials contested the congressional subpoenas on the grounds that
they constituted an improper congressional encroachment on core ex-
ecutive law enforcement functions."' Both the EPA and the DOJ ar-
gued that compliance with Representative Dingell's subpoenas would
make sensitive law enforcement documents public, thereby handicap-
ping law enforcement efforts.1 3 Executive branch officials particu-
larly feared disclosure of files pertaining to open cases." 4 These
105. See Brand & Connelly, supra note 83, at 77-78; Claveloux, supra note 64, at
1333-34; Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 205.
106. See Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 207. The controversy
began on March 10, 1982 when the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Over-
sight of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation held hearings to investi-
gate the EPA's enforcement of federal environmental statutes-specifically
CERCLA, also commonly referred to as the Superfund Act. Brand & Connelly, supra
note 83, at 78.
107. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 207. Congress first en-
acted CERCLA in 1980. CERCLA empowered the EPA to direct the clean up of
hazardous waste sites when a responsible party cannot be either feasibly identified or
forced to act. Id.
108. Id. at 208, 210.
109. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1335-36. Critics charged that under Gorsuch Bur-
ford's direction the EPA struck several "sweetheart" deals with violators of hazardous
waste disposal laws. Schroeder, supra note 16, at 261 & n.38 (citing newspaper ac-
counts detailing negotiations between agency officials and chemical industry repre-
sentatives, which allegedly lead to lenient settlements of Superfund claims).
110. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 217; see also id. at 217 n.63
(citing sources that discussed the political influence on administrative programs). For
example, EPA officials charged that the clean up of California sites had been held up
in order to damage the Democratic senatorial campaign of then-Governor Edmund
G. Brown, Jr. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1341 & n.58.
111. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 208-09.
112. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1342, 1348-49.
113. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 208-09.
114. Brand & Connelly, supra note 83, at 78; Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1348.
Executive branch officials feared that targets would be prematurely forewarned about
criminal investigations and that disclosure would weaken the EPA's bargaining posi-
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concerns led DOJ officials to recommend that President Reagan in-
voke executive privilege.1 15 As a result, on November 30, 1982, Presi-
dent Reagan directed Gorsuch Burford to refrain from releasing
documents from "open law enforcement files, [which] are internal de-
liberative materials containing enforcement strategy and statements of
the Government's position on various legal issues [that] may be raised
in enforcement actions.""' 6 Ultimately, the legislative and executive
branches resolved the dispute through political compromise: Gorsuch
Burford resigned (as a result of the broader controversy over her lead-
ership of the EPA) and executive officials turned over the subpoenaed
documents on the condition of confidentiality." 7
The Gorsuch Burford controversy thus illustrates several key as-
pects of clashes involving congressional oversight and executive privi-
lege. First, the dispute pitted two valid, constitutional interests against
one another: the congressional prerogative to investigate claims of
executive malfeasance and/or nonfeasance versus the executive privi-
lege to protect sensitive intrabranch communications, especially as
they relate to law enforcement." Second, such disputes typically in-
volve highly politicized issues and partisan interests. Third, negotia-
tions between executive and legislative branch officials often escalate
and take on institutional dimensions, which lead to interbranch polari-
tion during settlement negotiations. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1348. Additionally,
officials worried that enforcement efforts would be thwarted and litigation made im-
possible if disclosure revealed lists of potential witnesses, the available evidence, an-
ticipated defenses and legal issues, and the EPA's expectations of the precedential
impact of a ruling in that case. ML See also Professor Shane's discussion regarding the
DOJ's reluctance to turn over law enforcement documents. Shane, Executive Privilege
Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 511. For example, Professor Shane in-
cluded as examples of the DOJ's purported rationales for "nondisclosure of open
investigative files" the following:
forestalling political influence over the conduct of an investigation, prevent-
ing the disclosure of investigative sources and methods, protecting the pri-
vacy of innocent parties named in investigative files, protecting the safety of
confidential informants, and maintaining the appearance of "integrity, im-
partiality and fairness of the law enforcement process as a whole."
Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 212.
116. Id. at 208-09 (first alteration in original) (citing letter from Att'y Gen. William
French Smith to Rep. Dingell, dated November 30, 1982 and reprinted in H.R. Rep.
No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982)). Notably, in the Gorsuch Burford affair, the
subcommittee's suspicions of improper conduct were subsequently confirmed by evi-
dence that showed that political considerations did, in fact, influence the EPA's en-
forcement decisions. Id. at 211-12.
117. Brand & Connelly, supra note 83, at 81; Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1337-38.
118. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 508-14(describing congressional grounds for the investigation of the EPA as well as the
EPA's "legitimate" basis for resisting oversight); Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1349(stating that "both the subcommittee and the EPA had valid claims to the
documents").
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zation." 9 Finally, the branches frequently resort to political compro-
mise in resolving the dispute. As the next part describes, the ECS
controversy shared these characteristics with the Gorsuch Burford
incident.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ECS CONTROVERSY
Simmering discontent among EPA personnel, federal prosecutors,
and the legislative and executive branches have long dogged the envi-
ronmental protection program;120 criticism by members of Congress,
however, sparked the ECS controversy.' 2' The 1992 presidential elec-
tion further fueled and politicized the feud."2
This part describes the major aspects of the dispute. Arguably, the
genesis of the controversy stemmed from a study commissioned by a
congressional subcommittee. 23 This study charged the ECS with lax
enforcement of federal environmental laws, detailed alleged impropri-
eties in six case studies, and described an apparent trend of marked
centralization of prosecutorial authority. Commentaries and reports
referred to this centralization debate as the Bluesheet Controversy
("Bluesheet Controversy"). 124 The report spawned a series of con-
gressional hearings that focused on the ECS, its enforcement program,
and its record. 25 These hearings, in turn, led to congressional subpoe-
nas of documents and requests for testimony by ECS line attorneys,
both of which the DOJ vehemently resisted. 126 The hearings focused
on two distinct issues. The first concerned the clash between congres-
sional investigatory powers and executive confidentiality privileges,
while the second related to the degree to which prosecutorial deci-
sion-making authority should be centralized at Main Justice. 27
119. See, e.g., Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at
501, 516 (describing interbranch clashes as involving "intransigent 'positional' bar-
gaining" and "antagonism").
120. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
121. See Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 210-18.
122. See McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers, supra note 5, at A25
(stating that "[s]hortly before the 1992 presidential election, the Clinton-Gore cam-
paign climbed on the ECS-bashing bandwagon"); Text of Interview with Clegg and
Cartusciello, supra note 61, at 6 (Clegg commenting that election year politics drove
the manner in which Rep. Dingell's subcommittee investigated the ECS).
123. Thrley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3. Professor Turley directs The Envi-
ronmental Crimes Project at the George Washington University. Id. at 3.
124. See discussion infra parts II.A, II.D. The term "Bluesheet Controversy" refers
to the an important chapter in the ECS dispute. Specifically, the term alludes to the
disagreement that arose among DOJ personnel-and, over time, among commenta-
tors-regarding case management and decision-making procedures, and the manner
in which Main Justice supervised local USAOs in their prosecution of environmental
cases. See discussion infra part II.D.
125. See discussion infra part II.B.
126. See supra notes 58-59, 61 and accompanying text and discussion infra part
III.A.1.
127. See discussion supra part I.C.3 and infra part II.B.
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The executive branch responded by claiming executive privilege re-
garding the disputed documents and by commissioning its own inter-
nal investigation of the ECS.? Ultimately, compromise and
accommodation overcame both institutional polarization and partisan
politics to bring about a resolution. The Clinton administration
granted greater prosecutorial decision-making authority to USAOs.1'9
As with the Gorsuch Burford affair, a top official resigned. 3° Finally,
the executive branch acquiesced to congressional investigatory de-
mands.13' The subparts that follow detail each of these developments
in turn.
A. 1992: The Turley Preliminary Report
The ECS scandal stemmed, in great part, from a report by Professor
Jonathan Trley for Representative Charles E. Schumer in October
19, 1992, entitled Preliminary Report on Criminal Environmental
Prosecution by the United States Department of Justice ("Turley Pre-
liminary Report" or "Report").1'2 The Turley Preliminary Report re-
lied on confidential interviews conducted by the Report's staff and
investigators and on public congressional records.133 The Report sum-
marized its findings regarding the overall policies and performance of
the Section and highlighted instances of alleged prosecutorial wrong-
doing in six case studies. 34 In particular, the Report charged that
128. See discussion infra part I.C.
129. See discussion infra part Il.D.
130. See discussion infra part ILE.
131. See discussion infra part ILF.
132. See supra note 3.
133. I"irley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 4. The Environmental Crimes
Project ("Project") prepared the Turley Preliminary Report. The Project, a pro bono
effort, develops legislation and conducts criminal environmental research and is part
of the National Law Center of the George Washington University. Id. at 3.
134. See id. at 5. The Turley Preliminary Report stated that:
The Environmental Crimes Project [had] found evidence oL
1. a pronounced failure to prosecute environmental crimes to the same de-
gree as conventional crimes and a pronounced failure to prosecute indi-
viduals involved in environmental criminal conduct;
2. deep divisions and mistrust between the Environmental Crimes Section
and various United States Attorneys' offices;
3. chronic case mismanagement at the Environmental Crimes Section of the
Department of Justice;
4. internal policies of the Department of Justice that severely hamper prose-
cution in the wetlands area;
5. internal policies of the Department of Justice that restrict United States
Attorneys generally in pursuing environmental prosecutions;
6. chronic shortages in funding and support of criminal environmental inves-
tigations and prosecutions; and
7. possible political influence in both individual cases and general policies
within the Environmental Crimes Section.
Id. at 5-6.
The Turley Preliminary Report as well as the Internal Reviev issued in response by
the DOJ, see supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text, refer to the six cases as
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"[b]oth prosecutors and EPA investigators describe[d] the ECS as a
politically 'compromised' section with easy access for industry and
political figures."' 35 Thrley's group further concluded it had uncov-
ered evidence offering a "sufficient and compelling basis for congres-
sional inquiry into political influence in the prosecution of
environmental crimes by the [DOJ]."'1 36 The Report contained two
sections, the main conclusions of which the following two subparts
summarize. The first section presented six case studies illustrative of
the criticisms leveled against ECS by its critics, and the second ana-
lyzed the Section's administration of the federal criminal enforcement
program.
1. The Turley Preliminary Report's Conclusions Regarding its Six
Case Studies
The six case studies charged the Section with prosecutorial impro-
prieties and mismanagement. The Report asserted that all six cases
involved unwarranted leniency by the ECS towards targets of criminal
investigations. 137 Despite "solid support" and "overwhelming evi-
dence" favoring prosecution, 38 the authors charged that ECS person-
nel (usually in opposition to local USAOs, the EPA, and state officials
involved in the cases' 39) either sought plea bargains for lesser
PureGro, Weyerhaeuser, Van Leuzen, ChemWaste, Thermex, and Hawaiian Western
Steel. Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 34-38. This Note does not attempt
to determine whether, in fact, political considerations did influence prosecutorial
decisionmaking in those six instances. The most readily available (and informative)
public documents all reflect undeniable institutional biases, including, for example,
the Turley Preliminary Report commissioned by Rep. Schumer, congressional sub-
committee hearing transcripts, and the independent Internal Review commissioned by
the DOJ in response to congressional criticisms. Such an examination would also
involve a substantive determination about the application of environmental legal doc-
trines to facts that, in hindsight, cannot be ascertained accurately. These documents,
however, do shed light on such process-oriented issues as the DOJ's case oversight
and its relationship to Congress, subject matters on which this Note ultimately
focuses.
135. Id. at 30. The Turley Preliminary Report qualified its allegation, however, by
further noting that "[w]hile this Report makes no direct findings of political interfer-
ence in individual ECS cases, federal prosecutors and investigators have given the
Project detailed allegations of such conduct." Id. at 31.
136. Id at 32.
137. Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 34-38.
138. Id at 34, 36.
139. I& at 34-38.
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charges' ° or declined prosecution altogether. 41  Moreover, the au-
thors argued that the Section favored "organizational rather than indi-
vidual indictments."'142 Finally, the Report also asserted improper
meddling by top DOJ officials in prosecutive decision making and
even undue influence by outside political pressure. For example, the
authors maintained that, in two instances, top ECS officials met with
representatives of targets at Main Justice in the absence of EPA offi-
cials and AUSAs from local USAOs involved in the case. 43 In short,
the Turley Preliminary Report argued that "[i]n case after case, the
Environmental Crimes Section ha[d] overridden AUSA recommenda-
tions of prosecution on the basis of evidentiary questions commonly
left to the discretion of the local federal prosecutors."'" Additionally,
the authors wrote that, in one instance, ECS line attorneys believed
political pressure from the White House and lobbyists resulted in a
decision not to prosecute. 4
140. Id. at 34-35 (describing plea bargains for misdemeanors rather than prosecu-
tion of felonies in the PureGro and Weyerhaeuser cases). In particular, the Turley
Preliminary Report criticized plea agreements involving large corporate targets when
compared to prosecution of smaller companies and single defendants. Iii at 11-12.
According to the Report, settlements involving plea bargains and fines leveled against
corporations damaged the credibility of the DOJ by suggesting that corporate "of-
ficers can 'buy out' of personal accountability for their misconduct" and that corpo-
rate officers will escape prosecution. Id at 12.
141. Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 35-38 (summarizing the Section's
decision to decline prosecution in the Van Leuzen, Chemaste, Thermex, and Hawai-
ian Western Steel cases).
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 46. One such instance involved the PureGro case. The Report main-
tained that top DOJ officials held several meetings with the defense counsel at Main
Justice, which excluded the EPA and even the lead ECS line attorney assigned to the
case. Id. at 46-47. The DOJ denied this allegation and claimed that the EPA and the
lead prosecutor attended all meetings at which the defense counsel was present. I& at
46 n.14.
The Report cited Weyerhaeuser as another example involving unusual meetings be-
tween top DOJ officials and defense counseL I&. at 82. In that instance, a deputy
assistant attorney general met with counsel for Weyerhaeuser prior to the execution
of the plea bargain. Id.; see also id. at 20 (stating that "[p]rosecutors and EPA staff
have complained to the [authors] that they are often left out of critical meetings and
consulted only after the ECS has made a decision on the case... [and] specifically
object[ed] to meetings with defense counsel that exclude line prosecutors or EPA
representatives").
144. Id. at 7.
145. "Thrley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 106 (stating for example that
"[ECS prosecutors] felt that the [Van Leuzen] case was killed due to... the political
pressures placed on DOJ by the White House and outside groups"); see also id. at 30(alleging that various special interest organizations, including the Washington Legal
Foundation, had lobbied against wetlands prosecution).
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2. The Turley Preliminary Report's Conclusions Regarding ECS
Management and Administration of the Environmental
Criminal Enforcement Program
In addition to its critical treatment of the six case studies, the Turley
Preliminary Report found fault with the ECS's management and ad-
ministration. The authors first highlighted the strained relations be-
tween the EPA and the DOJ and between the USAOs and the
DOJ. 14  According to the Report, AUSAs complained that Main Jus-
tice imposed more stringent criteria for prosecution in the environ-
mental area than those which applied to other DOJ sections. 47
Additionally, Thrley's group alleged chronic case mismanagement by
the ECS.148
More importantly, the Turley Preliminary Report also emphasized
changes in the procedures applicable to environmental criminal cases
under the Bush administration, which antagonized both prosecutors in
ECS and at USAOs. 149 The changes included extending the period of
time Main Justice could review proposed indictments prior to prosecu-
tion from 48 hours to two weeks,15 0 as well as giving Main Justice veto
power over local USAOs' decisions in certain instances.15' According
to the authors, prosecutors perceived these changes as efforts by Main
Justice to further rein in prosecutorial authority at the local level and
to centralize enforcement in this sensitive area in Washington.1
52
3. Responses to the Turley Preliminary Report
The DOJ leadership responded with an emphatic denial of the
claims outlined in the Turley Preliminary Report. Following its re-
146. Id at 14.
147. 1& at 15; see also id at 19 ("The internal problems at the ECS clearly evidence
a fundamental division over standards and the rate of environmental prosecution.").
148. 1& at 17. According to the Turley Preliminary Report,
Specific complaints include[d]:
[(1)] long delays in ECS case management after the EPA ha[d] completed its
field investigation and proposed federal action;
[(2)] poor coordination with other agencies, particularly the EPA, in manag-
ing cases under review;
[(3)] failure to inform the EPA in a timely manner of decisions to drop pros-
ecutions or the basis for such decisions;
[(4)] selection of ECS unit chiefs or regional supervisors with little environ-
mental experience or with demonstrated reluctance in the prosecution of en-
vironmental cases; and
[(5)] poor coordination with U.S. Attorneys in case management.
Id-
149. Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 25-27.
150. Id. at 26. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
151. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
152. Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 26-27 (stating that "[p]rosecutors
in the ECS and U.S. Attorney's offices have suggested that this 'micromanagement'
[wa]s meant to control AUSAs in this sensitive area and discourage independent pur-
suit of environmental criminals").
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lease, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roger Clegg characterized
the case studies in the Report as examples of "good faith disagree-
ment[s] between career prosecutors and career investigators over
whether there was sufficient evidence to bring a particular criminal
charge in [a] case." ' Then ECS Chief Neil Cartusciello categorically
denied that political considerations influenced prosecutive decision
making.L 4
As noted previously, the ECS controversy sprang from the Turley
Preliminary Report. The charges outlined in the report elicited strong
denials from the executive branch and prompted an intensified inves-
tigation by Congress. The subpart below describes the content and
outcome of the congressional subcommittee hearings.
B. 1992-93: The Congressional Subcommittee Hearings
In late 1992 and early 1993, Representative Dingell, Chair of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Commit-
tee on Energy and Commerce, held a series of subcommittee hearings,
which focused on the enforcement of federal environmental stat-
utes.15 During his terms in Congress, Representative Dingell made
the federal environmental protection program a priority, investigating
the EPA on numerous occasions between the early 1970s and 1 99 3 .1S6
On September 10, 1992, Representative Dingell held a subcommit-
tee hearing "to examine, in detail, disturbing allegations that [the
EPA's criminal enforcement program was] being undermined by a
153. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *1. Clegg, how-
ever, also denounced the Turley Preliminary Report as a " 'political hatchet job,' com-
missioned by a Democratic congressman ... to make the Bush administration look
bad days before the 1992 election." Enforcement Report Alleges Justice Department
Failure to Prosecute Environmental Crimes Vigorously, supra note 3, at 1711.
154. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *3. Mr. Cartus-
ciello stated in an interview:
As far as political pressure, there wasn't a bit of political pressure. I know
that better than anybody because I was the fellow who was called upon to
make some of these decisions. [A]nybody who knows me knows what
my reaction would have been lad there been the slightest hint of political
pressure.
Id.
155. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The onset of Rep. Dingell's involve-
ment with the ECS dispute began in the Fall of 1992. On September 10, 1992, prior to
the release of Professor Turley's Preliminary Report, Rep. Dingell issued a statement
that the ECS failed "to pursue aggressively a number of significant environmental
cases," that the ECS supervisors manifested "a lack of environmental law expertise,"
and that the ECS suffered from "serious morale problems." McGee, Environmental
Crimes Controversy Lingers, supra note 5, at A25.
156. Lazarus, Neglected Question, supra note 57, at 214-15 (noting that Rep.
Dingell's persistent criticism of the EPA dated back to the 1970s). The House Energy
and Commerce Committee has stood out as especially tenacious in its oversight of the
EPA. For example, between 1984 and 1986, the Committee held more hearings at
which it requested the EPA to present formal testimony than any other House com-
mittee. Id at 213.
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pattern of bizarre and misguided decisions by supervisory personnel at
the Environmental Crimes Section at the Department of Justice."'157
On January 4, 1993, Representative Dingell's subcommittee publicly
criticized the DOJ's handling of a criminal investigation at the Rocky
Flats, Colorado, nuclear weapons facility.'
On November 3, 1993, Representative Dingell held a second House
Energy and Commerce subcommittee hearing on the ECS. He
charged that ECS policies exerted "a stranglehold on the majority of
Federal environmental crimes prosecution in Washington, rather than
in the field."' 159 As a remedy, Representative Dingell recommended
that the DOJ adopt a decentralized model of prosecutorial decision
making that would shift greater authority to the USAOs.at ° Repre-
sentative Dingell further demanded that the DOJ turn over docu-
157. Hearing 1992, supra note 4, at 1 (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell).
158. McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers, supra note 57, at A25.
This controversy also involved allegations by Congress of the DOJ's failure to prose-
cute aggressively violations of federal environmental laws. Federal Facilities: Congres-
sional Report Says Justice Department Failed to Pursue Rocky Flats Case Aggressively,
3 Env't Rep. 2253, 2253 (1993). Representative Howard Wolpe, a Democrat from
Michigan and former Chairman of the Investigation and Oversight Subcommittee of
the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee issued a report critical of the
DOJ's handling of the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant
near Denver, Colorado. Id. The report described disagreements between the USAO
and Main Justice over prosecutive decisions in the case, and resistance from the DOJ
to allowing prosecutors to testify before Congress. Id.; see also Minister, supra note
35, at 137-39 (providing overview of Rocky Flats controversy); Renee B. Lettow,
Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 Yale L.J. 1333, 1333-35 (1994)
(same); Barry Siegel, Showdown at Rocky Flats, L.A. Times, Aug. 15, 1993, at 22
(same).
159. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell). In re-
sponse to the changes under the Bush administration, which critics perceived as ef-
forts to gain control of federal environmental enforcement, Rep. Dingell wrote:
This Subcommittee's investigation to date has revealed that the implementa-
tion of the [changes in case procedures as outlined in the] 1993 Bluesheet (or
any other similar centralized review mechanism) is likely to impede environ-
mental prosecutions through cumbersome procedures and micro-
management.
Id. at 11. According to Rep. Dingell, prosecutors feared that centralization and in-
creased oversight by Main Justice would stymie enforcement efforts of environmental
crimes nationwide. Id. (stating that "[s]erious concerns have been expressed by nu-
merous former U.S. Attorneys and experienced Assistant U.S. Attorneys about the
adverse impact of the Bluesheet on joint state-local-federal task force efforts [and] the
diversion of productive prosecutive resources into unnecessary paperwork and bu-
reaucratic reviews").
Notably, Rep. Dingell suggested that centralization of prosecutive authority in-
creased the risk of improper political pressures influencing decision making. Id. (cau-
tioning against "the mischief which may ensue from the open invitation in the
Bluesheet to Washington lawyers and lobbyists to seek meetings with officials at Jus-
tice Department Headquarters concerning environmental prosecutions").
160. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell). Representative Dingell stated
that he supported decentralization because it "'energize[s] government to do every-
thing smarter, better, faster, and cheaper'" without "undercut[ting] consistency and
fairness." Id. at 3-4 (quoting the National Performance Review).
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ments, reports, and memos relating to approximately twenty cases as
well as allow subcommittee investigators to interview Section prosecu-
tors. 61 The subpart below describes how the Turley Preliminary Re-
port and continued congressional pressure forced the executive
branch to focus attention on the ECS.
C. 1993-94: The Department of Justice Internal Report
Following the presidential election in November 1992, Attorney
General Janet Reno responded to the Turley Preliminary Report and
sustained congressional scrutiny by ordering an independent internal
investigation of the Section by four government lawyers. 162 The DOJ
intended a comprehensive review of the federal environmental crimi-
nal enforcement effort, and former Associate Attorney General Hub-
bell testified before the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee
that the DOJ would "not restrict[ ] [the Internal Review's] scope in
any way.'' 1  Nine months later, on March 10, 1994, the four career
government lawyers appointed to conduct the investigation issued a
325-page report ("Internal Review" or "Review").' 6 Not surprisingly,
this report drew a different conclusion from the Turley Preliminary
Report.
The Internal Review largely exonerated the Section and its leader-
ship of the charge of improper or politically influenced declination
practices. 65 The authors, however, faulted the lackluster leadership
of the federal environmental crimes program and criticized the man-
161. Jerry Seper, Dingell Would Shift Justice Environmental Cases, Wash. Tunes,
Nov. 3, 1993, at A4; see also supra 58-59 and accompanying text. In a decision that
drew sharp criticism from prosecutors, Attorney General Janet Reno granted Rep.
Dingell's request. Seper, supra, at A4.
162. See Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 8-9 (noting order by Att'y Gen. Reno in
memorandum from Rep. Dingell to members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation).
Career government attorneys William J. Corcoran, Daniel S. Seikaly, Mary Incon-
tro, and Jeffrey P. lnear prepared the report. See Corcoran, Internal Review, supra
note 6. The four authors each came to the project after long careers as prosecutors.
At the time of the report, after twenty years experience as a prosecutor, Mr. Corcoran
was serving as Senior Counsel of the Criminal Division, which was assirned to the
Task Force investigating the U.S. House of Representatives banking facility. Id. app.
A. Mr. Seikaly was the Chief of the Transnational and Major Crimes Section as well
as the Environmental Coordinator of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia, and had fourteen years experience as a prosecutor. Id Ms. Incontro came
to Committee, after ten years experience as a prosecutor, having served as the Deputy
Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section within the Justice Department's
Criminal Division. Id. Finally, at the time of the Internal Review, Mr. Mfinear held the
position of Assistant to the Solicitor General at the DOJ and had previously served as
a Trial Attorney in the DOJ's Land and Natural Resources Division. Id.
163. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 200. The DOJ mandated the four prosecutors in
charge of the investigation to examine case oversight, the Section, and the six cases
(which the Turley Report analyzed). See id at 200-02.
164. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6.
165. The authors of the Internal Review stated:
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ner in which Congress dealt with the Section. 166 Not surprisingly,
Representative Dingell defended the work of the subcommittee and
dismissed the DOJ report.167 As the following section briefly de-
scribes, the committee, which prepared the Internal Review, con-
ducted a comprehensive analysis of the ECS and presented
recommendations for improving the Section.
1. Summary of Internal Review's Overview of ECS's Program
The independent investigators concluded that "pervasive distrust
... at every level" frustrated the federal environmental enforcement
program.168 The Review cited disjointed oversight by Main Justice,
unsettled and evolving legal doctrines in environmental law, wide-
spread institutional inexperience in enforcing environmental crimes,
and historic congressional antagonism toward the EPA as contributing
factors. 6 9 In addition, the Review reproached the Energy and Com-
merce Subcommittee for being a propagator of unsubstantiated
claims. 170
We have found no evidence substantiating the allegations that Justice De-
partment officials or employees relied on improper criteria in prosecuting or
declining to prosecute environmental crimes cases.
Id at 12; see also id. at 17 ("Based on interviews and an examination of the underlying
prosecutive documents, we conclude that the ultimate prosecutive decision in each of
[the six cases examined] was reasonable.").
166. The Internal Review stated that:
[T]he program has suffered from a frequent absence of teamwork and mu-
tual respect among ... individuals [working in the Department of Justice's
environmental crimes program], which has led to accusations that prosecu-
tion decisions have been made on an improper basis. We have found that
those accusations are unfounded and that they arise primarily from innu-
endo and unsubstantiated suspicions.
Id. at 11-12.
167. See Jim McGee, Internal Justice Report Rejects Impropriety At Environmental
Unit, Hits House Inquiry, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1994, at AS. The Washington Post
reported that, in response to the Internal Review, Rep. Dingell stated: "It should
come as no surprise to anyone familiar with bureaucratic behavior that an internal
agency review ... found little wrong within the agency.... The subcommittee's
inquiry continues, and the omissions and errors apparent in the internal review will be
addressed at the appropriate time." Id.
168. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 94. The authors surmised that the
pervasive distrust sprung from individual and institutional differences over how envi-
ronmental crimes should be enforced. Id. at 96. Disagreements over the scope, na-
ture, and operation of the environmental protection program intensified in the 1980s
with the expansion of criminal sanctions. Id. (noting that "absence of agreement was
particularly problematic because the Environment Division was accustomed to exer-
cising broad control over environmental cases, while the United States Attorneys
were accustomed to exercising broad control over criminal cases ... [resulting in]
inevitabl[e] clash[es] over the ultimate responsibility for environmental crime
prosecutions").
169. Il at 96-97.
170. See id. at 109. The Internal Review chastened the Subcommittee, noting that
"ad hominem criticisms are especially destructive, because they... personalize[ ]
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2. Summary of Recommendations of Internal Review
The independent investigators made recommendations relating to
the mission of the ECS, case oversight, and the Section's internal and
external relations. 17 1 Regarding internal relations, the Review first
emphasized the need for the DOJ to clarify the Section's mission-to
formulate policy, provide legal advice and training, and prosecute en-
vironmental crimes.'" Second, the authors stressed the importance
for the ECS to establish and maintain effective partnerships"v7 with
key agencies such as the USAOs, 74 the EPA,175 other DOJ environ-
mental litigation sections,'176 and other local and federal agencies in-
volved in environmental enforcement activities.
The Internal Review also examined the Section's internal manage-
ment." The Review recommended that the DOJ restructure ECS
management and organization in light of a rearticulated mission,178
and immediately dispel the acrimonious tension within the Section, if
necessary, through voluntary transfers of disgruntled personnel. 79 In
what are at bottom disagreements over policy, and [contribute] to the current dis-
trust." Id.; see also id. at 97-125 (reviewing Congress's role in the controversy).
171. Id at 127-71; see discussion infra part ILD (providing an overview of the
ECS's case oversight procedures).
172. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 128. The Internal Review sug-
gested that the ECS should issue general policy statements to guide AUSAs as well
conduct pre-indictment reviews of individual prosecutive decisions. Id. at 129-30.
While the authors acknowledged the drawbacks that both strategies present (eg., pol-
icy statements require time and can only offer a general abstraction of complex legal
principles, while individual reviews delay decision making and may alienate line attor-
neys), id. at 130-31, they suggested a "sensible use of both," a at 131.
173. Id. at 142-43.
174. Id. at 143-44. The Internal Review recognized the long-standing historic ten-
sion between Main Justice and the USAOs and called for enhanced mutual respect
between the two. Id. More specifically, the Internal Review advised that relations
could be improved through written policy guidelines, streamlined case oversight, and
enhanced communication and problem solving. Id. at 144-45.
175. Id. at 146-50. The Internal Review characterized the relations between the
ECS and the EPA as "seriously strained." Id. at 146. According to the investigators,
problems abounded. Fst, EPA personnel heightened tensions between the two by
making public criticism of the Section's prosecutive decisions. Id. at 147. Second,
EPA staff lacked adequate training to investigate and develop cases properly;, in addi-
tion, EPA's bias for "bean counting" resulted, all too frequently, in incomplete and
flawed referrals. Id. at 148-49. Third, ECS compounded the tension by reluctantly
providing EPA personnel with written explanations for declination decisions. Id. at
149-50.
176. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 157-60. The DOJ Environment
Division's other litigation sections include the Environmental Enforcement Section
("EES"), which oversees the civil enforcement program, and the Environmental De-
fense Section ("EDS"), which carries out the defending regulatory programs. Id. at
157. The Internal Review specified greater coordination among the Sections as a
needed reform, especially with regard to the selection of criminal versus civil enforce-
ment. Id. at 157-59.
177. Id. at 162-71.
178. Id. at 170-71.
179. Id. at 171. The investigators concluded that:
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addition to the Internal Review, the other significant steps taken by
Attorney General Reno regarding the ECS controversy involved case
management policy and procedures. The following section describes
the evolution of case management at the ECS, especially in light of
the controversial policies adopted under the Bush administration and
the Clinton administration's response.
D. The Bluesheet Controversy: Case Oversight and Allocation of
Decision Making Between United States Attorneys Offices
and ECS
Disagreements over how the DOJ should structure case oversight
and delegate prosecutive decision making comprised another impor-
tant aspect of the ECS controversy. Between 1984 and the present,
DOJ policy on case management-and in particular the allocation of
decision-making authority to prosecute cases between USAOs and
ECS-changed three times. 180 This subpart provides an overview of
the ECS's case oversight policies and procedures as set out in the
USAM.18
The Justice Department must take steps to ensure that the individuals in-
volved in the program work together cooperatively. The Justice Department
management should determine the roles that each Department component
will play in the process, and it should also make clear that any individual
who is unwilling to perform his or her assigned role and respect the assigned
role of others should not expect to continue his or her involvement in the
environmental crimes program.
Id. at 127.
180. See Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 25-26 (referring to two changes
between 1984 and 1988); Revised Bluesheet, supra note 20, at 1 (referring to a third
change in 1994).
181. The USAM contains a comprehensive compilation of the policies and proce-
dures that govern the USAOs and their relations to DOJ Divisions, federal investiga-
tive agencies, and other governmental entities. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note
6, at 37. The USAM first set out the procedures governing the Environment Division
in 1984. Id. at 6. The Attorney General's Advisory Committee ("AGAC"), which is
comprised of a representative group of U.S. attorneys, develops policy and issues
guidelines in the USAM. Id. The DOJ first revised the procedures that applied to the
ECS in 1988 and then again in 1993. Id. The DOJ last amended the USAM as it
applies to the ECS on August 23, 1994. Revised Bluesheet, supra note 20, at 1.
Moreover, the DOJ announces departmental policy changes through Bluesheets.
Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 37-38. The procedures for policy changes
in the USAM require that the AGAC review Bluesheets prior to their becoming part
of the Manual. lId at 38. If the AGAC objects to a Bluesheet, the committee negoti-
ates directly with the assistant attorney general for the Division that proposed the
change. Id If the AGAC and the assistant attorney general fail to reach an agree-
ment, they consult the associate attorney general. Id. Bluesheets remain valid for five
months from the date of issuance unless the DOJ incorporates the Bluesheet into the
text of the Manual or reissues the Bluesheet. Id.
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1. Case Procedures Prior to the 1993 Bluesheet Changes
The issuance of a Bluesheetlan in 1988 and a Bluesheet amendment
in 1993 created continued controversy, which plagued the ECS
throughout the Bush administration.1as3 Prior to the Bush administra-
tion, the DOJ and USAOs managed a relatively small caseload of fed-
eral environmental cases in an informal manner."s The USAM
reflected this arrangement in its procedures, which stated that "[t]here
are no precise rules for determining how responsibility for a criminal
environmental case is to be divided between the [USAOs] and
[ECS]. ' 1as The USAM further stated that primary responsibility for a
case could rest entirely with a USAO, with ECS, or with both on a
"shared basis," and that this responsibility would be determined on a
"case-by-case basis."'"
Despite these provisions, which intimated an unstructured power-
sharing arrangement, the USAM explicitly placed ultimate supervi-
sory authority over all federal environmental criminal cases with the
Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources Divi-
sion.1 7 This express grant of supervisory authority created contro-
versy and confusion among federal prosecutors.'88 Although the
USAM expressly granted the Assistant Attorney General the ultimate
authority to make prosecutive decisions, a requirement that Main Jus-
tice also consult with United States attorneys qualified this grant of
182. See supra note 181 (providing an explanation of Bluesheets).
183. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 25-26, 302-19 (providing an in-
depth history of the Bluesheet controversy over a ten-year period, starting in 1984
and, in particular, during the Bush administration).
184. Id at 62 n.73, 63 (reporting that 226 referrals between fiscal years 1983 and
1986 led to 211 conviction or pleas of environmental cases and that Main Justice had
established "informal working relationships" with EPA personnel and the USAOs).
185. USAM 1988, supra note 32, § 5-11.110.B.
186. Id § 5-11.110.A. Additional evidence of shared responsibilities involved case
initiation. The USAM indicated that case initiation under the federal criminal envi-
ronmental statutes would ordinarily occur by "simultaneous referral" to both Main
Justice and USAOs. Id. § 5-11.302.
187. Id. § 5-11.303 ("The Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Re-
sources Division has supervisory responsibility over all criminal proceedings arising
under the statutes [applicable to the ECSI."). The USAM further stated that the as-
sistant attorney general held the "final authority regarding the prosecution or declina-
tion" as well as the "authority to assume primary responsibility" of environmental
criminal cases. Id. §§ 5-11.303.A to 5-11.303.B. Furthermore, the assistant attorney
general could require that a USAO refrain from undertalting a prosecution. Id. § 5-
11.303.C. Prior to 1988, the USAM had made the assistant attorney general's final
authority implicit. See Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 305-06.
In addition, under the 1988 USAM, Main Justice retained extensive oversight over
cases for which USAOs exercised primary responsibility. See, e.g., USAM 1988, supra
note 32, § 5-11.304 (prescribing the information to be furnished to the ECS by the
USAOs); id. §§ 5-11.330 to 5.11.343 (outlining requirements relating to coordination
between the ECS and USAOs for cases in which USAOs have primary responsibility).
188. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 26 (explaining that members of
AGAC opposed the 1988 USAM amendments and "mistakenly interpreted [them] as
imposing a new 'prior approval' requirement").
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decision-making power.'89 Additionally, following the proper notifi-
cation and referral of a case from the local office to Main Justice, so
long as the Assistant Attorney General did not object, USAOs were
free to pursue a prosecution of a criminal environmental case.190
2. Case Procedures Subsequent to the 1993 Bluesheet
On January 12, 1993, the DOJ issued Bluesheet 5.004, which set out
significant changes in federal environmental criminal case initiation
and development procedures, and further centralized prosecutorial
power in Main Justice at the expense of USAOs.191 The 1993
Bluesheet contained an express "prior approval" requirement for
"priority" cases, but no requirement for other cases.' g2 The drafters
of Bluesheet 5.004 claimed that input from United States attorneys,
Assistant United States attorneys, and Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division attorneys helped fashion the policy reforms outlined
in the document. 93 Moreover, the Bluesheet purported to seek en-
hanced cooperation between ECS and USAOs,f94 and "more efficient
and effective handling of environmental prosecutions."' 95
Specifically, Bluesheet 5.004 shifted prosecutorial decision making
to Main Justice for a newly-created set of "priority categories."' 96 The
189. USAM 1988, supra note 32, § 5-11.110.B (stating that "[t]he decision for a
given case will be made ultimately by the Assistant Attorney General of the Land and
Natural Resources Division in consultation with the U.S. Attorney").
190. 1d § 5-11.304 (stating that a U.S. attorney could commence prosecution within
14 days of receipt of the referral of the case to Main Justice).
191. Memorandum from George J. Terwilliger III, Deputy Attorney General, Vicki
A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General (Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division), and Thomas Corbett, Jr., Chairman of the Attorney General's Ad-
visory Committee, to Holders of United States Attorneys' Manual Titles (Jan. 12,
1993) [hereinafter Bluesheet 5.004] (on fie with the Fordham Law Review).
192. Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 26.
193. Bluesheet 5.004, supra note 191 (cover memorandum).
194. Id.
195. Al. at 1.
196. Ia at 3. The Bluesheet noted that "some USAO investigations/cases [would]
necessarily be more significant in scope, complexity or issues and thus subject to a
need for greater review and control." Id. at 2. According to the Bluesheet, the Envi-
ronment Division would identify those cases requiring greater oversight. Id. Initially,
ten types of cases comprised the new "priority categories" that the Division would
scrutinize heavily: (1) RCRA violations; (2) wetlands violations; (3) Clean Air Act
Amendment violations (except for asbestos cases); (4) knowing endangerment
charges; (5) charges based on a negligence or (6) strict liability theory (unless part of a
plea agreement); (7) all charges based on the responsible corporate officer doctrine;
(8) all cases involving federal facilities; and, (9) all cases involving evidence derived
from self-auditing and implicating the DOJ's voluntary disclosure program. Id. at 2-3.
The list also included a tenth catch-all category that involved "any matter of national
interest." Ia at 3. The Bluesheet cited as an example of such a matter the initial
prosecution under a new statute or regulation or the prosecution of a "regulation the
validity of which is significantly in doubt." Id. Bluesheet 5.004 further explained that
the ECS would identify in writing to the USAOs the specific factors that would deter-
mine whether a case involved a matter of national interest. Id. at 3 n.1.
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Bluesheet also spelled out case initiation procedures in greater de-
tail.197 Finally, under the new policy, the ECS had twenty-one days
from the date a USAO referred a case to establish whether the refer-
ral fell under a priority category, 9 in which case Main Justice could
exercise greater oversight of the case. Bluesheet 5.004, like the 1988
USAM amendment, created a stir among prosecutors at Main Justice
and USAOs. 99
3. Case Procedures Adopted by the Clinton Administration
On August 23, 1994, in response to intense internal pressure from
ECS line attorneys, AUSAs, and Congress, Attorney General Reno
issued a Bluesheet revision (the "Revised Bluesheet"), which decen-
tralized prosecutorial decision making and shifted authority from the
ECS back to local USAOs. 00 Notably, in a cover memorandum of
the Revised Bluesheet directed to United States attorneys and the
ECS, Attorney General Reno expressed her hope that DOJ attorneys
would put the past behind them.20' As with Bluesheet 5.004, the Re-
vised Bluesheet once again emphasized the Department's goal of pro-
moting cooperative efforts between Main Justice and local USAOs.3°
The Revised Bluesheet retained the distinction between priority
and nonpriority cases. Under the new policy, USAOs would hold re-
sponsibility for the approval, investigation, and prosecution of all non-
priority environmental crimes.20 3 The Revised Bluesheet further
defined priority cases (or "cases of national interest") as those that
present a novel issue of law, require simultaneous investigations in
multiple districts, implicate international or foreign policy, or raise an
urgent or sensitive issueY-° In such an instance, the Revised
197. Id. at 4-5.
198. Id. at 5.
199. Environmental Crimes Bluesheet Revised, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 16, at 9, *1(Sept. 5-19, 1994) (stating that the 1993 Bluesheet elicited "months of intense pres-
sure from congressional Democrats and some U.S. attorneys who claimed that, by
centralizing control over cases in ECS, the 1993 [B]luesheet undercut the ability of
local prosecutors to vigorously pursue environmental crimes"). But see Corcoran, In-
ternal Review, supra note 6, at 323-24 (characterizing the reactions to the Revised
Bluesheet as "remarkably varied" and indicating that following its issuance "the mat-
ter [did] not appear to be a continuing source of significant controversy").
200. Environmental Crimes Bluesheet Revised, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 16, at 9, *1
(Sept. 5-19, 1994); Revised Bluesheet, supra note 20, at 2-4.
201. Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to United States Attorneys
and the Environmental Crimes Section 1 (Aug. 23, 1994) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
202. Revised Bluesheet, supra note 20, at 1.
203. Id. at 3 (setting out USAM § 5-11.104) (stating the USAOs would take lead
responsibility "except in cases of national interest"). This Bluesheet provision indi-
cated that the ECS could participate-either as co-counsel or lead-in such non-pri-
ority litigation. Id. The Revised Bluesheet carefully noted, however, that in such
instances the allocation of case responsibility between Main Justice and the USAOs
would need to be clearly demarcated. Id.
204. Id. (setting out USAM § 5.11.105).
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Bluesheet guaranteed USAOs the opportunity to litigate the case
"jointly as co-counsel.52 0 5
In addition to the Bluesheet revision issued by Attorney General
Reno, the final chapters of the ECS controversy involved the resigna-
tion of the ECS chief and the decision to allow documents to be
turned over to, and line attorneys to be interviewed by, the congres-
sional subcommittee. The subparts below describe these events.
E. The Resignation of Neil Cartusciello
Late in the Bush administration and during the early Clinton years,
ECS Chief Neil Cartusciello figured prominently in the ECS contro-
versy. Opponents of the Section's prosecutive policies made Mr. Car-
tusciello a primary target of disapproval.2 06  The DOJ's Internal
Review failed to stave off further congressional scrutiny of the ECS
and, in fact, renewed tensions between a Democratic Congress and a
Democratic executive branch. °7 Citing an inability to secure respite
from media coverage and continued congressional probes, Mr. Cartus-
ciello resigned as chief of the ECS on April 1, 1994.208 Along with Mr.
Cartusciello's resignation, the DOJ's eventual compliance with con-
gressional requests for information, as described below, probably
helped resolve the dispute.
205. Id.
206. For example, Professor Turley's Preliminary Report leveled a number of
charges against Mr. Cartusciello. First, the Report charged that Mr. Cartusciello
demonstrated a "limited environmental background[ ]" and a reluctance to enforce
federal environmental crimes. Turley, Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 9-10
(charging that Mr. Cartusciello "refused to prosecute cases where there ha[d] been
strong support from U.S. Attorneys' offices and objectively strong evidentiary foun-
dations"); see also id at 18 ("Mr. Cartusciello's selection was controversial with ECS
members and local AUSAs [because he] came to the ECS with no environmental
experience from his previous work as an AUSA and.., has [shown] a marked reluc-
tance to prosecute in a number of cases.. ").
The Turley Preliminary Report's most serious accusation leveled against Mr. Car-
tusciello dealt with case management. The Report asserted:
There is ... widespread belief among prosecutors that the ECS has been
intentionally "micromanaged" by Justice officials to slow down prosecutions.
Since its formation, the ECS has been subject to a remarkable level of con-
trol and interference from high-officials at Main Justice. Prosecutors inter-
viewed for this Report have suggested that both White House and high-level
Justice officials have attempted to force AUSAs to submit cases to the ECS
in order to delay and discourage prosecutions.
Id. at 31.
207. McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers, supra note 5, at A25.
Tension between a Democratic Congress and a Democratic Executive continued un-
abated following the release of the Internal Review. Id.
208. Justice Department Top Environmental Lawyer Quits Amid Controversy, supra
note 5, at A16; Jim McGee, Chief of Environmental Crimes Section Quits, Wash. Post,
Apr. 2, 1994, at A4.
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F. Short-Term Resolution of ECS Conflict with Congress
As in the Gorsuch Burford case in the early 1980s, Attorney Gen-
eral Reno skirted further conflict with Congress by accommodating
Representative Dingell's requests for information. ' In fact, Attor-
ney General Reno turned over all the documents dealing with the
DOJ's internal investigation into the disputed ECS cases, documents
which the Dingell subcommittee subpoenaed on March 11, 1994.210 In
addition, Attorney General Reno also agreed to permit subcommittee
investigators to interview staff prosecutors regarding the handling of
ECS cases.211
Attorney General Reno's directives elicited sharp criticism from
prosecutors and commentators across the country who warned that
the DOJ's action set a dangerous precedent that chilled prosecutorial
discretion, and improperly encroached on core executive functions 12
As the subpart below notes, however, criticism has abated and the
ECS dispute no longer troubles the Clinton administration.
G. The ECS Out of the Spotlight. The Aftermath of the
ECS Controversy
Today, this chapter of legislative-executive branch tension over en-
vironmental policy appears to have concluded. Observers, including
Representative Dingell, responded favorably to the appointment of a
career environmental crimes prosecutor, Ronald Sarachan, to succeed
Neff Cartusciello.1 3 More importantly, the congressional elections of
1994 radically shifted partisan control of the legislative branch and, in
particular, of congressional oversight of the federal environmental
program from the Democrats to the Republicans.2 14 This political
shift, more than any other factor, may be responsible for bestowing
209. Dateline Justice, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 7, at 15, *4 (Apr. 18, 1994) (stating
that on March 21, 1994 the ECS "[sought] to avoid a showdown with Rep. John
Dingell").
210. Id.; Jim McGee, House Panel Subpoenas Justice, supra note 11, at A4.
211. See Seper, supra note 161, at A4 (noting that Attorney General Reno reversed
a "long-standing policy of protecting career prosecutors from outside scrutiny" and
ordered line attorneys to "submit to interviews voluntarily").
212. See, e.g., Cartusciello Resignation Unlikely to Stem Dispute, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H)
No. 7, at 2, *3 (Apr. 18, 1994) ("That Reno complied with both Dingell subpoenas
dismayed supporters of prosecutorial autonomy throughout DJ."); Hansen, Smear
at Justice, supra note 5, at A21 (characterizing DOJ's decision to "require its line
prosecutors to answer for their decisions directly to Dingell" as "an astonishing abdi-
cation"). But see Abas, Dingell's Justice Probe is Justified, supra note 5, at A15 (argu-
ing that Rep. Dingell's probe was reasonable).
213. Dingell Pleased, Hazardous Waste News Business Publishers, 1994 WL
2515925, at *1 (July 18, 1994) (describing Sarachan as a "career environmental crimes
prosecutor").
214. Greens See Danger, Opportunity in New Congress, Env't Week, 1994 WL
2511363, at *3 (Nov. 10, 1994).
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upon the ECS diminished scrutiny by Representative Dingell.215 In
fact, management reforms under the new ECS Chief have elicited lit-
tle scrutiny from commentators,216 and even a final report by Repre-
sentative Dingell's former staff, which alleged a whitewash of the ECS
controversy by the Internal Review, aroused minimal interest.217
Thus, the ECS controversy arose at the time of the Turley Prelimi-
nary Report, gained momentum with congressional hearings on the
Section, the DOJ's Internal Review, and frequent adjustments to
ECS's case management procedures; and finally died down with an
electoral shift in political power. The interbranch and intrabranch
tensions sketched above, however, implicate far-reaching separation
of powers, prosecutorial, and environmental policy concerns. More-
over, the marked antagonism the ECS dispute created among institu-
tions of the executive and legislative branches lingers. In fact, the
very accounts of the controversy reveal that the branches cannot im-
munize themselves against institutional bias and even betray political
(if not partisan) influences.21 8
In the remaining parts, this Note focuses on two inquiries. Part III
reflects on the proper balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches in the federal criminal environmental arena-in
particular, the interbranch conflict over congressional oversight of the
ECS. Part IV contemplates intrabranch (as well as interbranch) feud-
ing over the proper allocation of federal environmental prosecutive
authority within the DOJ.
III. INTERBRANCH CONFLICT OVER CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
OF THE ECS
This part further explores the ECS debacle and examines the doctri-
nal stances adopted by the executive and legislative branches regard-
ing Congress's power to investigate the Section's prosecutive record.
This part concludes with a discussion of the importance of political
compromise and institutional accommodation in resolving interbranch
conflicts such as the one sparked by the ECS controversy.
A. The Executive Doctrine of Congressional Oversight of the ECS
As previously noted, the DOJ initially resisted congressional inves-
tigation of the ECS.2 19 Unlike the Gorsuch Burford scandal (which
215. Cf. id. at *3 ("It's likely that... the Department of Justice Environmental
Crimes Section will have a respite from the close scrutiny of Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman John Dingell....").
216. ECS Restructures Smoothly, With One Exception, 4 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 18,
at 9, *1 (Oct. 17, 1994).
217. Dingell Offers New Evidence of ECS Whitewash, 5 DOJ Alert (P-H) No. 3, at
7, *1-2 (Feb. 20, 1995).
218. See supra notes 167, 170 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 59 and discussion infra part III.A.1.
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involved President Reagan issuing an Executive Memorandum pro-
scribing the disclosure of open investigatory files to Congress), 2 the
ECS dispute generated no such presidential response. The executive
branch's legal stance can only be discerned from DOJ officials' public
statements, congressional replies to DOJ correspondence, and, to a
lesser degree, observers' commentary-responses which the subparts
below discuss.
1. DOJ Officials' Resistance to Congressional Oversight of
Prosecutorial Decision Making
DOJ officials offered both legal and public policy reasons for con-
straining Congress's power to compel testimony from line attorneys
and to subpoena documents relating to open cases? 2'1 For example, in
an in-depth interview in October, 1992, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Roger Clegg cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),
which prohibits prosecutors from making public grand jury delibera-
tions, as embodying similar confidentiality concerns to those debated
during the ECS dispute.tm Mr. Clegg, along with ECS Chief Neil Car-
tusciello, also offered public policy rationales to explain ECS's resist-
ance to congressional scrutiny of prosecutorial decision making. The
two officials stated that, while they would personally testify before the
subcommittee, they strongly opposed congressional interviewing of
line attorneys.tm They argued that direct congressional scrutiny of in-
dividual line attorneys would exert a "chilling effect" on prosecutors'
conduct of their deliberationsu2 In addition, Mr. Clegg feared that
220. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 511;
Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1337.
221. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *2.
222. Id.; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) (stating that an attorney for the govern-
ment "shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise
provided for in these rules").
223. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *2 (stating that
"[they] ha[d] repeatedly offered to make [them]selves available to the subcommit-
tee"); see also id. at *1 (noting that "[they] ha[d] tried repeatedly to present the facts
to the subcommittee staff and were rebuffed at every step"). According to Mr. Clegg,
the DOJ would even have agreed to subcommittee questioning of line attorneys so
long as the Department and the subcommittee agreed on the "ground rules" of the
interviews. Id. at *2. Mr. Clegg further stressed that a policy of requiring previously
agreed upon parameters whenever Congress interviews line attorneys "ha[d] to be
honored across the board." I&.
224. Id. Mr. Clegg explained that "the Department [wa]s reluctant to have its line
attorneys turned into political footballs every four years." Id. Mr. Clegg further
noted-
We don't think that our prosecutors should have in the backs of their minds,
when they make tough prosecutorial calls, that if they make a politically un-
popular decision to indict or not to indict, then a congressman can haul them
up into the public arena and grill them about the reason they made those
very tough decisions.
Id.; see supra note 61.
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explicit public discussions of cases, which the DOJ had declined to
prosecute, would be unfair to former targets of investigations.2 5
Mr. Clegg's and Mr. Cartusciello's comments intimated a paradigm
of prosecutorial decision making that shields prosecutors from con-
gressional and, in particular, politically motivated second-guessing.
This model envisioned prosecutorial decision making-generally and
during the ECS dispute-that would rely almost exclusively on legal
considerations .1 6 According to the interviewees, the Section's decli-
nation decisions depended solely on whether prosecutors believed suf-
ficient evidence existed to bring a criminal charge. 2 7 Moreover, Mr.
Clegg charged that Congress had politicized and tainted with suspi-
cion these declination decisions that "basically boil[ed] down to a
good faith disagreement between career prosecutors and career inves-
tigators. ''2 1 Nonetheless, Mr. Clegg adfiiitted that the DOJ does not
make completely apolitical prosecutive decisions and that political
appointees in supervisory positions do, in fact, participate in
prosecutorial decision making.2 29
225. Id. at *2; see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing additional
public policy concerns associated with congressional investigations of open criminal
cases).
226. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *4-6. Mr. Car-
tusciello categorically denied that political considerations influenced prosecutorial de-
cisions at the ECS. Id. at *6 ("There was no political pressure whatsoever-not a bit,
not a hint, not a sniff, not a smidgen, not a scintilla."); Interview: Cartusciello Defends
DOJ Enviro Crimes Work, Am. Pol. Network, Inc. Greenwire, at 1 (Apr. 28, 1994);
see discussion infra part IV.B.3 (discussing executive branch conceptions of de-
politicized prosecutorial decision making).
Throughout this part, this Note refers to the terms "political" and "partisan." "Par-
tisan" is defined as either an "adherent to a party, faction, [or] cause" or "composed
of, based upon, or controlled by a single political party or group." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, supra note 8, at 1647. By contrast, although "political"
also has the narrow meaning of "relating to, or involved in party politics," the term
can also mean "of or relating to government ... or the conduct of governmental
affairs ... as distinguished from matters of law." Id. at 1755. Thus, the two terms can
clearly be used synonymously. The term "political" (as defined above), however, can
also refer to broader concerns involving the making of governmental policy, while the
meaning of "partisan" is restricted to the influence of party considerations. In other
words, the former term "political" can be employed when examining macroscopic
issues-such as the development of prosecutorial policy nationwide, while the latter
term "partisan" may be more appropriately used in case-by-case determinations of
party influence over government actions. This Note treats both words synonymously
unless otherwise indicated.
227. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *1.
228. Id. (characterizing the subcommittee's conduct as "election year politics").
Mr. Cartusciello also viewed as commonplace disagreements between ECS line attor-
neys and supervisory prosecutors regarding declination decisions. Id. at *4. Mr. Car-
tusciello, however, maintained that federal policy mandates and requires supervisory
review of prosecutions. Id.
229. Id. at *6. Mr. Clegg stated that:
The prime movers [making prosecutorial decisions] were career lawyers.
What the political leadership did was to approve the case to begin with and
then approve dismissing the case too.
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2. Commentaries Critical of Congressional Oversight of
Prosecutorial Decision Making
Many critics less directly linked to the ECS or the executive branch
similarly expressed outrage at Representative Dingell's actions. These
critics considered Representative Dingell's demands for information
to be motivated by base political considerations and to constitute un-
constitutional encroachments by Congress on a sacrosanct area-
prosecutorial discretion. For example, in addition to a series of caus-
tic editorials in newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal,30 two
Washington organizations issued papers condemning Congress's at-
tempts to investigate individual ECS prosecutors. As described be-
low, both these commentators advocated a model of prosecutorial
discretion (in particular regarding career attorneys) similar to the one
suggested by DOJ officials. This ideal embraced entirely depoliticized
prosecutorial decision making.
The Heritage Foundation published in 1993 an address by former
Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti entitled Justice Unbalanced:
Congress and Prosecutorial DiscretionI Mr. Civiletti raised separa-
tion of powers and policy concerns regarding the Clinton administra-
tion's decision to permit congressional personnel to interview ECS
line attorneys.'22 First, while acknowledging the constitutionality of
Congress's investigative prerogative, 23 Mr. Civiletti asserted that "it
is now well settled that the prosecutorial function lies exclusively with
the Executive Branch, and it has the absolute discretion to prosecute,
or not prosecute, a case."''  Mr. Civiletti characterized the conflict as
a question of "where to draw the line between Congress's right to
know and the Executive's duty to preserve the prosecutorial process
in an atmosphere as untainted by partisan politics as is possible in our
system."'235 According to Mr. Civiletti, the civil liberties of individuals
underlie the rationale of shielding prosecutors from political scrutiny
We've made a point that the principal decision was at the career level. I
am not going to apologize for the fact that in any case political appointees
have input. This is a democratic republic, and the executive branch is staffed
by people who are put there by a president who is elected. So there is noth-
ing sinister about those people having input into decisionmaking.
Id Here, Mr. Clegg most likely intended the broader meaning of "political," rather
than the narrower meaning of "partisan." See supra note 226.
230. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
231. Benjamin R. Civiletti, Justice Unbalanced. Congress and Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, Address Before The Heritage Foundation (Aug. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Ad-
dress by Benjamin R. Civiletti Before The Heritage Foundation] (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
232. Id. at 1. Mr. Civiletti carefully noted that the Clinton administration agreed to
interviews that would not be conducted under oath or in public. i
233. Id at 3.
234. Id at 2 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), and Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
235. Address by Benjamin R. Civiletti Before The Heritage Foundation, supra note
231, at 3.
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and the decision whether to prosecute a case should rest exclusively
with the executive branch. Legislators because of their susceptibility
to political pressures should have no voice in such deliberations.236
Additionally, he argued that public policy compelled the executive
branch to exercise exclusive control over prosecutions.237 Attorney
General Civiletti concluded that, while Congress can legitimately in-
vestigate law enforcement matters,2 8 the line should be drawn at
questioning line attorneys about specific cases to avoid the "substan-
tial danger that . . . congressional pressure" might influence
prosecutorial decisions."
The Washington Legal Foundation expressed concerns similar to
those voiced by Attorney General Civiletti in a paper entitled The
Legislative Politicization of the United States Department of Justice.24°
The author, Stuart Gerson, discussed separation of powers concerns
236. Id. at 5-6.
237. Id. at 6. Mr. Civiletti argued that prosecutors, given their intimate understand-
ing of the criminal justice system and the evidence uncovered in investigations, are
best able to determine whether a case should be prosecuted. Id. Citing Attorney
General Robert Jackson, Mr. Civiletti further advanced the following three reasons
for withholding information from Congress: (1) violators would benefit from know-
ing the extent of the government's information, the nature of the evidence collected,
and the witnesses identified; (2) law enforcement depends on the ongoing receipt of
information from confidential informants, whose identity must remain secret; and, (3)
disclosure would work grave injustices on innocent individuals who were initially sus-
pected but ultimately exonerated of wrongdoing. ld.; see supra notes 113-14.
238. Id. at 3, 7. Mr. Civiletti wrote:
Congress may legitimately be displeased with the general enforcement of a
particular law, and Congress's oversight powers certainly enable it to inquire
into such matters. Congress is entitled to know the facts and figures regard-
ing the number of prosecutions brought or pending, the number of convic-
tions, and the length of sentences and amount of fines collected. Congress
would also be entitled to know the amount of time spent prosecuting various
types of cases, the standards for prosecution, the basis on which the prosecu-
tor weighs certain factors in deciding to prosecute, and the cost of prosecu-
tion. Finally, Congress is entitled to learn about difficulties encountered in
prosecution-for example-ambiguity in the language of a statute.
Id. at 7.
239. Address by Benjamin R. Civiletti Before The Heritage Foundation, supra note
231, at 7 (citation omitted); see also id. at 8 (stating also that "Congress can collect all
the information it needs to carry out its legislative function without questioning line
attorneys or inquiring into specific cases"). Mr. Civiletti further stated:
Congressional inquiry into applicable prosecution standards and statistics is
appropriate. Furthermore, congressional inquiry directed to supervisory
presidential appointees regarding major closed cases may be appropriate,
where there is a showing of substantial reason to believe wrongdoing oc-
curred. But the line should be drawn to shield line attorneys, who make the
day-to-day prosecutorial decisions on behalf of the Attorney General, from
outside influence, political or otherwise.
Id. at 3.
240. Gerson, supra note 12, at 1. Mr. Gerson served as assistant attorney general in
charge of the Civil Division during the Bush administration and as acting attorney
general of the United States during the first months of the Clinton administration. See
id.
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related to Congress's exercise of subpoena power over law enforce-
ment personnel, and the risk that undue congressional (i.e. political)
pressure would influence prosecutorial decisions. 1 Mr. Gerson,
however, like Mr. Clegg, also acknowledged the political nature of the
executive branch.242 Nonetheless, Mr. Gerson, like Attorney General
Civiletti, drew the line at congressional questioning of line attorneys,
suggesting that the executive branch must resist such a practice and
protect "the independence of non-political staff" against encroach-
ment by the most political branch-Congres.2 3
3. The Independent, Apolitical Prosecutor: The Executive's Ideal
Critics of congressional oversight of the ECS-in particular of in-
vestigations that delve into open cases and question line attorneys-
presented a uniform ideal of prosecutorial discretion. Although con-
ceding that Congress can legitimately oversee law enforcement, these
prosecutors and commentators strenuously opposed congressional
second-guessing of front-line prosecutors' decisions, compulsion of
document production in open investigations, and public hearings re-
lating to pending cases." In addition, while acknowledging that the
executive branch is a political branch and that political appointees
hold top DOJ supervisory positions, these observers maintained that
such line attorneys should nonetheless aspire to discharge their duties
in as wholly disinterested and objective a manner as possible. 4
Under this ideal, separation of powers insulates the prototypical pros-
ecutor from congressional political interference-in fact, from any
political influence at all. This paradigm dictates that the career attor-
ney determine whether a case merits litigation by considering legal
241. Md at 1 (describing such congressional investigations as "pos[ing] a long-term
constitutional threat by impinging upon the core, judicially-unreviewable, [elxecutive
[b]ranch function of rendering independent decisions concerning the undertaking or
forbearance of criminal prosecutions"). Mr. Gerson also indicated that "[i]f congres-
sional committees are able to reverse decisions and prosecutive policies, the legisla-
ture will be performing an executive function." Id. at 2.
242. Md at 4 ("The [e]xecutive [b]ranch is, after all, a political branch, and it is
responsible ultimately to the people.").
243. Id. at 4. Mr. Gerson wrote:
While the Executive is answerable politically, the thing that it is answerable
for is fidelity to the law and independence of judgment. The Executive may
disclose its reasons for prosecutorial action or inaction, but it must do so on
its own terms, not those of a coordinate political branch. If such disclosures
are called for and the public interest requires them to be made, the Execu-
tive should undertake them through its appointed policy makers, Le.,
through those who are politically responsible, and not by sacrificing the po-
tential independence of non-political stalL
Id. Mr. Gerson further noted that the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
the question whether Congress can compel a DOJ line attorney to testify nor conclu-
sively resolved the issue of document production in such an interbranch conflict. Id. at
3.
244. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and law enforcement criteria alone . 46 This viewpoint, however, con-
trasts sharply with the perspective espoused by the legislative branch.
The following subpart examines Congress's legal posture during the
ECS interbranch conflict.
B. Congressional Doctrine of its Investigative Prerogative over
ECS's Enforcement Record
Observers of interbranch conflicts have few sources from which to
divine Congress's legal understanding of its constitutional powers. 47
Like the executive branch, and unlike the judiciary, the legislative
branch does not possess institutional means conducive for developing
a legal opinion."4 Nonetheless, Congress makes law by legislating,
and expresses legal opinion in hearings and reports.24 9 Congress's
legal justification for its investigative prerogative can best be dis-
cerned from the congressional record. For example, Representative
Dingell's subcommittee introduced into the record a memorandum
prepared by the American Law Division of the Congressional Re-
search Service ("Congressional Research Service") (a part of the Li-
brary of Congress), which responded to Attorney General Civiletti's
address.2 50 The memorandum, as reviewed below, revealed Con-
246. See, for example, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice ("Standards"),
which provide that a government attorney should not prosecute in "the absence of
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction." ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function Standard 3-3.9 (1993) (pertaining
to discretion in the charging decision). More specifically, the Standards identify two
criteria to guide declination decisions: (1) prosecutors ought to make negative charg-
ing decisions only for good cause; and (2) when made, declination decisions must be
in the public interest. Id Standard 3-3.9(b).
The Standards further enumerate specific factors that the prosecutor ought to con-
sider in exercising his or her discretion. Id. Standard 3-3.9(b)(i)-(vii). The factors are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (ii)
the extent of the harm caused by the offense; (iii) the disproportion of the
authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant; (v) reluctance of the victim
to testify; (vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction
of others; and (vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by anotherjurisdiction.
Id. Finally, the Standards also adopt an ideal of prosecutorial discretion that is en-
tirely depoliticized. For example, the Standards recommend that, in making
prosecutorial decisions, prosecutors avoid being swayed by "political ... interests," id.
Standards 3-1.3(f), disregard "personal or political advantages or disadvantages," id.
Standards 3-3.9(d), and endeavor to be detached and objective. Id. (stating that "pros-
ecutor[s] [ought to maintain] proper professional detachment"). See discussion supra
part I.B.1.
247. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 477.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 477-81.
250. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 12-41 (memorandum from the American Law
Division of the Congressional Research Service to the House Subcommittee entitled
Legal and Historical Substantiality of Former Attorney General Civiletti's Views as to
the Scope and Reach of Congress' Authority to Conduct Oversight of the Department
of Justice).
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gress's view that it has more frequently pursued investigation of seri-
ous ethical lapses within the executive branch than the DOJ and the
White House have.
1. Congressional Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
Regarding Congressional Oversight of Law Enforcement
Not surprisingly, the memorandum by the Congressional Research
Service, which relied on congressional custom and its own interpreta-
tion of Supreme Court precedent, adopted a view entirely contrary to
that of Mr. Civiletti. The authors chronicled a history spanning 70
years of congressional inquiry into DOJ activities, including compul-
sion of testimony from line attorneys regarding declination deci-
sions.25 ' The memorandum asserted that Congress's constitutionally
based investigative power reached law enforcement decisions and in-
cluded the power to interview line attorneys and inspect pending in-
vestigative files.2n To support its case, the Congressional Research
Service cited Supreme Court cases as well as anecdotal evidence 5 3
The authors' analysis debunked the view that, constitutionally, law
enforcement constitutes a core executive branch function.2-  Relying
251. Id. at 15, 24-41. The memorandum reviewed cases such as the ECS's, which
involved congressional scrutiny of DOJ prosecutorial decisions between 1920 and
1992. Id. at 16 ("In the majority of instances reviewed, the testimony of subordinate
DOJ employees, such as line attorneys and FBI field agents, was taken formally or
informally, and included detailed testimony about specific instances of the Depart-
ment's failure to prosecute alleged meritorious cases.").
252. Id. at 14 ("Our review... indicates that the numerous pertinent Supreme
Court precedent... support a broad and encompassing power m the Congress to
engage in oversight and investigation of the administration of executive agencies that
would reach all sources of information that would enable it to carry out its legislative
function."). The memorandum described a low legal threshold for a subcommittee to
investigate validly the executive. Id. The authors wrote:
We are aware of no court precedent that imposes a threshold burden on
committees to demonstrate a "substantial reason to believe wrongdoing oc-
curred" before they may seek disclosure wvith respect to the conduct of spe-
cific open and closed criminal and civil cases. Indeed, the case law is quite to
the contrary. An inquiring committee need only show that the information
sought is within the broad subject matter of its authorized jurisdiction, is in
aid of a legitimate legislative function, and is pertinent to the area of
concern.
Id. (paraphrasing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 117 (1959)). Moreover,
the memorandum expressly concluded that the congressional investigatory preroga-
tive extends to pending criminal cases. Id at 16 ("[T]hose having evidence in their
possession, including officers and employees of the Justice Department, cannot law-
fully assert that because lawsuits are pending involving the government, 'the authority
of [the Congress], directly or through its committees, to require pertinent disclosures'
is somehow 'abridged.' ")
253. See e.g., Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 13-23 (surveying Supreme Court case
law with regard to Congress's constitutionally based investigatory powers).
254. Id. at 20-23. The congressional researchers cited Morrison v. Olson for the
proposition that the Supreme Court has "rejected the notion that prosecutorial discre-
tion in criminal matters is an inherent or core Executive function." Id at 20. Accord-
ing to the memorandum, the Morrison Court held the exercise of prosecutive
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in part on Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 55 the memo-
randum asserted that the constitutionality of an investigative action
depends on a balancing of the burdened executive function against the
claimed legislative objective. 56 The Congressional Research Service
concluded that, on the whole, prosecutorial discretion alone will not
trump Congress's legitimate investigative power.2 57 Once the authors
ascertained the legal basis for the legislative investigative prerogative,
the memorandum explored case studies (summarized below), which
revealed public policy rationales for exercise of this power.
2. Congressional Perspective: The Threat of a Politicized and/or
Compromised DOJ
The Congressional Research Service conducted a historical survey
of congressional investigations into DOJ wrongdoing during the pe-
riod of 1920 to 1992.258 This compilation highlighted serious lapses of
integrity by top DOJ officials that severely compromised the Depart-
ment's credibility.2 59 These case studies implicitly underscored Con-
discretion to constitute a "typical[ ]," but not "central," executive branch function. Id.
(citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1968)).
For additional commentary supporting this view, see the works of Susan Low Bloch
and Stephanie A.J. Dangel. Bloch, supra note 92, at 635 (asserting that "history does
suggest that law enforcement was not as 'core' a presidential function as foreign af-
fairs and war" and that "early legislators did not explicitly require presidential control
of the Attorney General"); Dangel, supra note 92, at 1070 (same).
255. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1979); see supra notes 81-82 (commenting briefly on the
Court's treatment of congressional investigative powers in United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974)).
256. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 22.
257. Id. ("Given the legitimacy of Congressional oversight and investigation of the
law enforcement agencies of government, and the need for access to information pur-
suant to such activities, a claim of prosecutorial discretion by itself would not seem to
be sufficient to defeat a Congressional need for information.").
258. Id. at 24-41.
259. For example, the memorandum described the Teapot Dome Scandal. During
the mid-1920s, legislators convened a Senate select committee to investigate the con-
duct of Department of the Interior ("DOI") personnel in connection with the leasing
of naval oil reserves. I& at 24-26. In particular, the committee inquired into charges
that the DOJ failed to prosecute the wrongdoers in the DOI scandal. Id. at 24. Again,
during the 1950s, Congress investigated numerous allegations of prosecutorial mis-
conduct within the DOJ. Id. at 26-28. For example, one investigation focused on alle-
gations of prosecutorial misconduct-specifically in grand jury proceedings-in
federal tax fraud cases. Id. at 27 (stating that the subcommittee questioned grand
jurors regarding pressure by DOJ attorneys to prevent grand jurors from conducting a
thorough investigation and efforts by DOJ attorneys to induce the jurors to absolve
the DOJ of impropriety in its handling of tax fraud cases).
Congressional investigations into allegations of DOJ malfeasance or misfeasance
continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. For example, from 1974 to 1978, Senate
and House committees studied the intelligence operations of federal agencies, includ-
ing units within the DOJ. I& at 30. In addition, in 1979, Congress investigated
charges of fraudulent pricing of fuel in the oil industry and the DOJ's failure to effec-
tively investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes. I&. at 32.
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gress's interest in investigating allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
on the part of DOJ personnel, and in particular political appointees.
C. The Need for Interbranch Accommodation and Political
Compromise
On the one hand, executive privilege validly checks improper over-
reaching by the legislature, especially where partisan goals account for
legislative motives and where subcommittee subpoenas of documents
and line attorneys jeopardize law enforcement efforts. Critics voice
their outcry most compellingly when representatives betray naked at-
tempts to embarrass their rival political partym0 by leveling particu-
larly weak charges of prosecutorial misconduct against the DOJ.61
Unprincipled and undisciplined congressional oversight can lead to
disastrous results: subcommittee investigations motivated by partisan
ends can cripple a section of the DOJ, result in massive expenditures
of scarce governmental resources, and disable law enforcement ef-
forts. Protests against congressional overreaching, however, ring
hollow when the executive branch's credibility has been blemished by
meaningful evidence of wrongdoing.2 -
A particularly politicized incident involved an inquiry focused on Billy Carter, Pres-
ident Carter's brother, and his activities on behalf of the Libyan government. Id. at
33. According to the Congressional Research Service:
A significant portion of this inquiry concerned the Department's handling of
its investigation of the Billy Carter matter, in particular whether Attorney
General Benjamin R. Civiletti had acted improperly in withholding certain
intelligence information about Billy Carter's contacts with Libya from the
attorneys in the Criminal Division responsible for the investigation, or had
otherwise sought to influence the disposition of the case.
.. [W]itnesses [before the congressional subcommittee] testified about
the general structure of decisionmnaking in the Department, the nature of the
investigation of Billy Carter's Libyan ties, the Attorney General's failure to
immediately communicate intelligence information concerning Billy Carter
to the Criminal Division attorneys conducting the investigation, the decision
to proceed civilly and not criminally against Carter, and the effect of various
actions of the Attorney General and the White House on that prosecutorial
decision.
Id. at 33.
260. See e.g., Enforcement: Report Alleges Justice Department Failure to Prosecute
Environmental Crimes igorously, supra note 3, at *1710-11 (DOJ official Clegg stat-
ing that the Turley Preliminary Report was a" 'political hatchet job,' commissioned by
a Democratic congressman ... to make the Bush administration look bad days before
the 1992 election").
261. See e.g., Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *1(Clegg stating that the subcommittee had selected six cases out of a thousand and
asserted a pattern of lax enforcement). As noted previously, this Note does not at-
tempt to judge the merits of the DOJ's decisions to decline prosecution in the six case
studies featured by the Turley Preliminary Report.
262. See, e.g., Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at
514 (arguing that strains on the Reagan administration's credibility brought about by
the James Watt imbroglio and growing allegations of EPA wrongdoing undermined
the executive branch's legitimate case for nondisclosure in the Gorsuch Burford
affair).
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On the other hand, Congress legitimately polices prosecutorial mis-
conduct and other law enforcement wrongdoing within the executive
branch by means of its investigative prerogative. History has demon-
strated that DOJ political appointees may fall susceptible to political
pressures. 63 Questions abound regarding when and how political ap-
pointees can properly consider political factors in setting prosecutorial
policies or in supervising prosecutorial decision making.29 Moreover,
if some degree of politicized decision making and supervision inevita-
bly occurs among DOJ political appointees, the question remains how
career attorneys both stay in control of front-line criminal enforce-
ment and remain shielded from external partisan pressures.2 65 At bot-
tom, Congress's access to information serves a critical function in
ensuring governmental accountability.2 66
The subparts above described the polarized legal postures of the
executive and legislative branches during the ECS dispute. As with
the Gorsuch Burford case,2 67 each branch assumed an all-or-nothing
position: Congress asserted that its investigative prerogative was all-
embracing while the executive branch regarded executive privilege as
a complete shield. 68 Clearly, framing the question in absolute terms
contributes to its insolubility. One commentator has suggested that
the legal questions raised by interbranch conflicts over information
sharing may not require conclusive resolution. 69
263. See, e.g., Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 16-17 ("The consequences of these
historic [congressional] inquiries have been profound and far-reaching, directly lead-
ing to important remedial legislation and the resignations (Harry M. Daugherty, J.
Howard McGrath) and convictions (Richard Kleindienst, John Mitchell) of four attor-
neys general.").
264. See discussion infra part IV.
265. See discussion infra part IV.
266. See Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 462.
267. See discussion supra part I.C.3.
268. Compare Gerson, supra note 12, at 4 ("The Executive may disclose its reasons
for prosecutorial action or inaction, but it must do so on its own terms, not those of a
coordinate political branch.") with Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that,
irrespective of the consequences, Congress possesses the sole discretion to choose
between the "[c]ongressionally generated publicity [that] may result in harming the
prosecutorial effort of the Executive" and "access to information under secure condi-
tions [that] can fulfill the [c]ongressional power of investigation and at the same time
need not be inconsistent with the authority of the Executive to pursue its case").
269. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 484
("[G]overnment lawyers facing separation of powers issues ... should adopt the view
that each branch, within its particular jurisdiction, is entitled to interpret the Constitu-
tion for itself."); see also id. at 519 ("As long as the two political branches can reach
resolutions of immediate disputes, there should be no ... institutional obstacle to
their 'agreeing to disagree' about the law.").
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Rather, separation of powers disputes require political compromise,
institutional accommodation, 27 and partisan self-restraint.' 71 Many
interbranch conflicts have been resolved, more or less successfully,
through mediated settlements.2 l Sensitivity on the part of the con-
gressional subcommittees to law enforcement concerns, for example,
may require receiving sensitive information in executive session (i.e.,
in nonpublic hearings). Similarly, reasonable acquiescence on the part
of the DOJ to document requests can ameliorate unnecessary inter-
branch antagonism.273 Finally, only self-restrained and principled
conduct-which restricts partisan antics to a minimum-on the part
of both executive and legislative branch officials can prevent pro-
tracted interbranch conflicts from occurring. As one commentator
noted:
270. Id. at 493-94. Professor Shane wrote:
The Constitution builds into each branch's relationship to the others a neces-
sary tension. On one hand, the branches' interrelationships have competi-
tive aspects, which to some extent would obviously be legitimated by
recognizing as law each political branch's independent assertion of legal in-
terpretation. In the abstract, this competition is beneficial because it fulfills
what the founding generation foresaw as an important check on the power
of each branch....
On the other hand, the competition among the branches must be suffi-
ciently restrained to ensure a government that is workable and responsible.
The branches must attune themselves to long-terna, as well as short-term,
institutional interests.
Id.; see also Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1350 (stating that "[m]ost disputes are sus-
ceptible to compromise, and [that] this is the preferred method of resolution" (foot-
note omitted)).
271. Cf. Claveloux, supra note 64, at 1354 ("Congress must be undertaking a legiti-
mate legislative function and the executive branch must be correct that the informa-
tion is of a type traditionally considered to be privileged.").
272. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 524 (list-
ing strategies whereby the branches reconciled their interests, including, for example,
executive release of information but under protective conditions, with redactions, and
in summary form). The Congressional Research Service also discussed exemplary in-
stances of interbranch cooperation over information sharing. One case, for example,
involved the 1979 House investigation of fraudulent pricing of fuel. The memoran-
dum noted that "[t]he hearing record evidenced the sensitivity of the subcommittees
to the due process implications of their inquiry and the acquiescence of the Depart-
ment in the manner in which the subcommittees received and handled the open-case
criminal and civil materials." Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 32. In that instance, the
subcommittee heard testimony and received evidence regarding pending criminal
cases in closed hearings. Id. In addition, the DOJ agreed not only to turn over docu-
ments (which discussed the Department's declination decisions), but also to allow the
documents to be made public if Congress determined a compelling need to do so. Id.
A second example pertained to subcommittee hearings of the Abscam scandal dur-
ing the early 1980s. In that instance, the DOJ and Congress entered into an "elabo-
rate access agreement." Id. at 34. The agreement allowed "considerable give and
take" between the two branches and contributed to establishing smooth working rela-
tions between legislative and executive branch officials. Id. at 35.
273. Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 480
("[Public policy concerns such as national security] may obligate a congressional sub-
committee ... to respect a good faith executive branch demand that it receive sensi-
tive information only in 'executive session.' ").
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If it is true not only that law is a form of politics, but that law for
Congress and for the President is only politics in the narrowest and
most partisan sense, a great part of our professed constitutionalism
is an illusion and much government lawyering is merely an expen-
sive fraud upon the public.274
The need for self-restraint, self-scrutiny, and self-discipline by officials
within both the executive and legislative branches cannot be over-
stated. The exercise of such restraint presents the only answer to the
constant threat of unresolvable, broadly political and narrowly parti-
san interbranch tensions.
Thus, both congressional oversight of, and executive privilege re-
garding, law enforcement constitute legitimate prerogatives by the
legislative and executive branches. Both serve critical constitutional
functions and contribute to the proper governance of our nation. Inci-
dents like the ECS dispute and the Gorsuch Burford controversy,
however, reveal that interbranch disputes inevitably occur and that
our nation's system of governance functions imperfectly. These im-
perfections, inherent in any tripartite system, stem from interbranch
contests over institutional prerogatives. The challenge facing the leg-
islative and executive branches (and to a lesser extent the judiciary)
involves striking a proper balance in such interbranch disputes. Un-
fortunately, in interbranch disputes, many officials instead succumb to
the lure of consolidating institutional power.275
Questions remain, of course, regarding the reach of these legitimate
powers and the manner in which the branches may properly exercise
them. Balancing the two prerogatives may require determining: (1)
which branch can more faithfully remain self-disciplined and exercise
self-restraint from partisanship-the executive or the legislative; (2)
what threshold level of congressional oversight of environmental law
enforcement should be sought; (3) to what degree can the executive
branch effectively police itself, and what indicators reveal intrabranch
infractions sufficiently serious to warrant targeted congressional inves-
tigation. The principle of self-restraint, moreover, must undergird all
these inquiries.
This part examined the level of oversight that Congress appropri-
ately applied to prosecutorial decision making. The ECS dispute
raised concerns of autonomy and accountability in another context as
well. Distinct viewpoints emerged concerning the wisdom of central-
izing environmental prosecutive decision making at Main Justice. The
274. Id. at 500-01. Shane advances a model termed a "government of laws," id. at
485, which emphasizes accountability and "constraint on individual whim" in the
processes of governance. Id. at 490.
275. Cf. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 57, at 223 (discussing "polit-
ical" and "institutional competition" between the legislative and executive branches,
which may involve partisanship and which is inherent to the constitutional design).
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next part explores legislative and executive branch perspectives on the
advantages and drawbacks of centralization.
IV. INTER- AND INTRABRANCH DIFFERNCES OVER ALLOCATION
OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
WrrimN THm EXECuTrVE BRANCii
This part examines a second central aspect of the ECS dispute: in-
ter- and intrabranch tensions became even more strained over the al-
location of prosecutorial decision-making authority between Main
Justice and local USAOs in the federal criminal environmental pro-
gram. As previously noted, both congressional subcommittees, as well
as executive branch officials, found fault with Bush administration
policies, which they viewed as improperly centralizing prosecutorial
authority at Main Justice. 276 The first subpart reviews the debate over
prosecutors' enhanced discretion and power, in particular
prosecutorial autonomy from external checks by entities such as the
legislature and the judiciary. The second subpart briefly summarizes
the congressional and DOJ positions regarding the centralization of
prosecutorial discretion over federal environmental crimes at Main
Justice.
A. Background on Prosecutive Authorityt'
During the late 1960s and 1970s, academics and criminal justice ex-
perts examined prosecutorial discretion and, in particular, focused at-
tention on the development of prosecutorial standards related to
charging decisions.278 The broad debate that ensued explored the ten-
sion between the countervailing policy goals inherent in prosecutorial
discretion: the goal of ensuring that prosecutors charge in a uniform,
consistent, and non-arbitrary manner must be balanced against the
need for sufficient latitude, flexibility, and sensitivity in adjusting
charging decisions to individual circumstances.279 Whether the ten-
sion between these competing policy goals of flexibility and consis-
tency can ever be conclusively resolved remains in doubtYm
276. See e.g., Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 197-208 (conducting leading question-
ing by Rep. Dingell of former Associate Attorney General Hubbell strongly sugges-
tive of Rep. Dingell's opposition to centralizing prosecutive authority at Main
Justice); Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 4 app. E (characterizing the
DOJ's purported rationales behind centralizing prosecutive authority (e.g., maintain-
ing accurate statistics and uniform application of environmental laws) as a "sham").
277. See discussion supra part I.B.1.
278. See, eg., Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry
188, 214 (1969) (stating that prosecutors wield enormous power, through both positive
and negative charging decisions, and that this broad discretionary power calls for a
comprehensive review and analysis).
279. Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1971).
280. See Mfller, supra note 42, at 172. One commentator has described this quan-
dary as follows:
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Twenty years after the onset of the debate, prosecutorial discretion
has expanded rather than contracted.28 Today in the United States,
commentators typically view prosecutors-both on the federal and lo-
cal level-as possessing broad discretionary powers regarding investi-
gatory and charging decisions.218 Similarly, experts deem even the
federal system, which consists of appointed (rather than publicly
elected) local prosecutors, to be a decentralized system of case over-
sight within which local USAOs operate with a great deal of auton-
omy from Main Justice.2 3 The debate raises two questions. First, to
what degree should prosecutorial discretion be restrained, if at all, by
internal checks (such as guidelines) or external checks (such as the
judiciary or legislature)? Second, within the executive branch, how
centralized should prosecutorial discretion be? The subparts below
briefly discuss these questions, in turn.28 4
Whether a reasonable compromise can be reached between the necessity for
discretion and flexibility which usually justifies a relatively uncontrolled ad-
ministrative process and the desirability of affording the citizenry the kind of
protection against arbitrary action usually associated in the minds of lawyers
and laymen alike... is by no means clear.
Id.
281. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 393
(1992) (stating that "prosecutors wield vastly more power than ever before"); Ken-
neth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
669, 672 (discussing the broad discretion of prosecutors in exercising the charging
function); Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Alive and
Wel and Living in Indiana?, 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 657, 659 (1990) ("It is without
doubt that prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute.");
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SMU L.
Rev. 965, 966 (1984) (suggesting that problems have resulted because "prosecutors...
have developed a sense of insulation from the ethical standards of other lawyers");
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
tors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 58 (1991) (maintaining that "[t]he prosecutor's
freedom from client control gives rise to vast discretion").
282. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 41, at 465 (stating that the federal prosecutor's
"decision to bring criminal charges is beyond review").
283. Id. at 465-66. Moreover, this commentator also perceived U.S. prosecutors to
be cautious with regard to charging decisions, particularly with respect to complicated
white collar crimes. Id. at 466.
284. The degree of prosecutorial autonomy (from external checks) that is most ap-
propriate constitutes a major topic for research. This Note addresses this question
cursorily in order to examine a second related issue: the degree of prosecutorial au-
tonomy (from internal checks) that most efficiently, equitably, and effectively ad-
vances environmental law enforcement efforts. During the ECS dispute, the parties
framed this issue in terms of the proper extent of centralized prosecutorial decision-
making in Main Justice. See supra note 276; see also Text of Interview with Clegg and
Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *5 (discussing Main Justice's "rationale for central con-
trol of environmental crimes").
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1. Internal and External Constraints that Restrict the Scope of
Prosecutorial Discretion
Internal controls include formal guidelines, official memoranda, and
public or nonpublic policy statements. 2 s For example, the USAM
provides government attorneys with some guidelines concerning
charging decisions; however, where the USAM provides such guide-
lines, it nonetheless allows for broad prosecutorial discretion.2 The
DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution ("PFP" or "Principles") also
provide broad guidelines that prosecutors should follow when making
charging decisions. According to the PFP, each United States At-
torney and responsible Assistant Attorney General should establish
internal office procedures regarding prosecutorial decision making3 s
The Principles also address the criteria prosecutors should consider
when initiating or declining prosecution,8 9 and expressly prohibit
government attorneys from considering political factors in making
such determination.2 9
Regarding external controls, neither statutory provisions nor judi-
cial decisions have enunciated detailed standards to guide in the exer-
cise of charging discretion. 91 In particular, the case law reveals an
extraordinarily pronounced and deep-rooted reluctance by the courts
285. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1543-45. In theory, the grand jury and prelimi-
nary hearing function to buffer ordinary citizens from prosecutorial abuse; however,
neither process presents a formidable barrier to prosecutorial autonomy. Id. at 1537-
38.
286. Beck, supra note 40, at 322.
287. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution (1980) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). Attorney General Civiletti issued the PFP in order to "en-
sur[e] the fair and effective exercise of prosecutorial responsibility by attorneys for
the government" and to "promot[e] confidence on the part of the public and individ-
ual defendants that important prosecutorial decisions will be made rationally and ob-jectively on the merits of each case." Id. at i-il.
288. Id. 1 3, at 2 (stating that internal office procedures would ensure "that
prosecutorial decisions are made at an appropriate level of responsibility, and are
made consistent with these principles" and "that serious, unjustified departures from
the principles set forth herein are followed by ... remedial action"). The PFP further
advised that U.S. attorneys or assistant attorneys general establish internal proce-
dures for review and documentation of prosecutive decisions. Id. 1 3 cmt., at 3. The
PFP, however, cautioned against a rigid application of internal guidelines, which
would jeopardize fair prosecution of criminal cases. 1&. 1 4 cmt., at 3.
289. Id. pt. B, at 5-15. According to the Principles, a government attorney should
prosecute a target if she believes his conduct constitutes a federal offense and the
admissible evidence would probably sustain a conviction. Id. J 2, at 5-6. A govern-
ment attorney may properly decline to commence a criminal case, however, when no
substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution; when the target is subject
to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or, when an adequate noncriminal
alternative to prosecution can be pursued. Id 12 cmt, at 7.
290. Id. 6, at 14 (stating that "[i]n determining whether to commence or recom-
mend prosecution or take other action, the attorney for the government should not be
influenced by ... political association, activities, or beliefs").
291. Mfiller, supra note 42, at 5.
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to review prosecutive decisions.2" Most commonly, the courts reason
that charging decisions are not amenable to judicial review because
the court can never be as intimate with the facts of a case and parties
as the prosecutor.2 93 In addition, one commentator has argued that
judicial participation in charging decisions would jeopardize the
judge's passive and neutral role in the adversary system.2 94 Finally,
both case law and commentators justify judicial deference to the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion on grounds of separation of powers.295
2. Proponents of the Status Quo
Proponents of the status quo view the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion as deeply rooted in the American political tradition.296 Fur-
ther, they reason that prosecutors require broad discretion to carry
out their law enforcement duties effectively. Some advocates value
prosecutorial detachment and argue that political considerations
ought not enter into the calculus of charging decisions.29 Others as-
sert that, while prosecutorial discretion ought to remain broad, polit-
ical pressures inevitably play a role and may even benefit the public
by forcing prosecutors to be accountable. 98
292. Writing about prosecutorial authority, the Supreme Court in Wayte v. United
States noted:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Govern-
ment's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Govern-
ment's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) ("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise [of
prosecutorial] discretion .... ."); Gershman, supra note 281, at 435 ("One of the most
disturbing developments in criminal justice over the last two decades has been the
judiciary's failure to provide clear standards that would place some rational limits on
the prosecutor's discretion."); P.S. Kane, Comment, Why Have You Singled Me Out?
The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion for Selective Prosecution, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2293,
2295 (1993) ("The courts' continued deference to the prosecutor's virtually unchecked
discretion to render 'individualized justice' serves only to increase the risk that abuse
of such discretion will occur undetected.").
293. See Dennis, supra note 41, at 467; Beck, supra note 40, at 319.
294. Pizzi, supra note 15, at 1353.
295. Cothran, supra note 43, at 771; see also Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive
Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea 53-58 (1981) (conducting a
critique of prosecutorial discretion especially as it relates to the guilty plea).
296. Pizzi, supra note 15, at 1328.
297. See, e.g., Lance M. Africk, Prosecutorial Discretion: Striking a Balance, 36 La.
BJ. 17, *4 (1988) ("The... political association.., of an offender [is an] example[ ] of
[an] impermissible consideration[ ]."); Miller, supra note 42, at 297 (stating that "the
prosecutor is selected to exercise his personal judgment unimpaired by personal inter-
est or bias").
298. See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 15, at 1344 (stating that "the indirect political con-
trols that exist over American prosecutors are.., not meaningless").
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a. External Controls
As a general rule, advocates for broad prosecutorial discretion
maintain that legislative and judicial oversight of the prosecutor's de-
cisions should be restricted for a number of reasons. First, as de-
scribed previously, some commentators fear that judicial2" and
legislative second-guessing will chill the prosecutorial decision-making
process. 00 Champions of broad discretion assert that political ac-
countability and the public's opportunity to express its choices at the
ballot box serve as a sufficient external check on excessive
prosecutorial discretion-at the local level with publicly elected pros-
ecutors and even at the national level with appointed United States
attorneys.301 Such commentators, while acknowledging the advan-
tages and disadvantages that political pressures present, also view
political controls as a hallmark of our nation's democratic govern-
ance.3°2 Finally, this position points to the adversarial trial system it-
self as a check on prosecutorial abuses.a 3
b. Internal Controls
Proponents of the current system argue that guidelines, which re-
formers tout as a panacea for prosecutorial abuses, present several
disadvantages. 30 First, making guidelines public creates law enforce-
ment concerns. For example, if guidelines offer some leniency to of-
fenders, prosecutors fear that the guidelines Wll undermine the
299. Cothran, supra note 43, at 771 ("Courts recognize a prosecutor's broad discre-
tion to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions ... in part because the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.").
300. As described in part III, this argument asserts that prosecutors will be reluc-
tant to document the rationales behind their charging decisions in any significant way,
because they will fear legislative reprimands. In addition, fear of legislative second-
guessing may improperly sway prosecutors' judgment. This argument further claimed
that the prosecutor, the person most intimately familiar with the case, is in the best
position to make the charging decision (which will entail at a minimum evaluating the
evidence and learning about the potential defendant). Proponents for the status quo
also point out that law enforcement necessarily involves investigations and accumula-
tion of data that is confidential. Thus, public airing of law enforcement strategies and
techniques will seriously hamper effective enforcement of the law. Finally, if the leg-
islature investigates declination decisions, targets of investigations (whose cases pros-
ecutors ultimately decide not to prosecute) may be unfairly maligned in the process.
See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
301. Gerson, supra note 12, at 4; Pizzi, supra note 15, at 1338, 1342-44.
302. Pizzi, supra note 15, at 1338. This commentator remarks that the national tra-
dition tends to hold prosecutors politically accountable, id., particularly because the
public has politicized crime, it at 1341. Additionally, the U.S. has traditionally fa-
vored local public oversight over state bureaucratic controls of public officials. Id. at
1337.
303. Id. at 1349. Thus, as one proponent for the status quo maintains, the adver-
sarial system requires screening of weak cases, and forces prosecutors to think in
terms of winnable cases-not probable cause. Id at 1349-50.
304. Id. at 1364-67.
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deterrent value of the penal law.3"5 Second, guidelines can never be
sufficiently comprehensive; inevitably, unanticipated cases will con-
front prosecutors and necessarily demand the exercise of discretion. °6
In sum, commentators who advocate broad prosecutorial discretion
support limits on both internal and external checks on that power. By
contrast, critics of prosecutorial autonomy, as described below, argue
that prosecutorial abuses can be curbed only by strengthening con-
straints on prosecutors' power.
3. Proponents for Change
Critics of the current system present a wide range of arguments for
reform. For example, some commentators fear that prosecutors wield
far too much power, without adequate checks on abuse;307 that courts
have allowed prosecutorial power to grow in recent years;30 8 and that
sentencing guideline reforms have expanded such power even
more.30 9 This view maintains that excessively broad prosecutorial dis-
cretion runs counter to traditional ideals of fair and effective criminal
administration.31 ° Moreover, many observers of the criminal justice
system suspect that significant numbers of prosecutors abuse their dis-
cretion311 and allow political considerations to influence improperly
their prosecutive decisions .3 1  Advocates for reform reason that, be-
cause such pressures are inevitable, prosecutorial excesses may be
checked only by strengthening internal and external controls.
305. Id.
306. Pizzi, supra note 15, at 1368.
307. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1521. Professor Vorenberg defines prosecutorial
discretion as "the ability to make decisions about guilt and degree of punishment
without the limits of rules or other constraints on freedom of action, including judicial
review, generally imposed on other public officials making decisions of comparable
import." Id at 1523-24; see also Gershman, supra note 281, at 431-48 (maintaining
that judicial constraints over prosecutorial excesses have been rolled back signifi-
cantly and that the judiciary has failed to provide meaningful guidelines with respect
to prosecutorial decision making).
308. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1523 ("If accumulation of power is success, prose-
cutors have done well in recent years."); Gershman, supra note 281, at 393
("[P]rosecutors wield vastly more power than ever before.").
309. Gershman, supra note 281, at 418-23 (arguing that narrowing the range of pos-
sible sentences that judges may impose has given prosecutors greater power through
their charging discretion); Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1525 (same).
310. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1545. Professor Vorenberg asserts that "[t]he
existence and exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most fun-
damental principles of our system of justice and our basic notions of fair play and
efficient criminal administration." Id at 1554.
311. Kane, supra note 292, at 2295-300 (citing empirical studies on selective prose-
cution and proposing reforms); Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1555 ("Prosecutors can
and do accord different treatment ... on grounds that are ... [neither] rational,
consistent, [n]or discoverable .... ").
312. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1558.
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a. External Controls
Critics of the status quo espouse strengthened external controls, in-
cluding judicial, legislative, and political checks on prosecutorial
abuses. This group acknowledges that the judiciary will be unwilling
to second-guess prosecutorial charging decisions, unless such decisions
constitute constitutional violations and reveal selective and discrimi-
natory conduct.
Legislative oversight might be more effective in constraining
prosecutorial abuses.313 This view asserts that the legislature has an
affirmative obligation to ensure that the laws it enacts are enforced, 314
and that such a goal can be achieved both by enacting more detailed
legislation 15 that curbs prosecutorial discretion and by requesting
more frequent information sharing regarding law enforcement strate-
gies and the development of prosecutorial criteria.3 16 Advocates of
such reforms further argue that vigorous oversight can accommodate
concerns for confidentiality of sensitive information regarding targets
and pending cases and the need to keep law enforcement strategies
secret.317 Finally, even among proponents for change, one commenta-
tor recommended that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion be as
depoliticized as possible, 18 and, specifically, that Congress even de-
politicize the appointment process for positions within the DOJ.3 19
b. Internal Controls
Regarding internal controls,320 critics most frequently advocate the
development of detailed guidelines and policy statements to define
charging criteria with greater precision.3 2 As previously mentioned,
313. Beck, supra note 40, at 376; Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1566.
314. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1566.
315. J. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 825, 831 (1994); Vorenberg, supra note 40,
at 1567-68.
316. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1567.
317. Id.
318. Beck, supra note 40, at 376.
319. 1d
320. Id. at 314-16 (discussing internal controls). Arguably, policies, guidelines, and
directives comprise various forms of internal control According to Beck, policies set
out the broadest statements of an agency's position toward various subjects, id. at 314,
guidelines consist of more specific texts than policies and usually enumerate specific
prosecutorial criteria, id. at 315, and directives are even more specific and usually
mandatory, id. at 316-17. While policies and guidelines have been developed to gov-
ern prosecutorial discretion, directives usually address procedural issues of criminal
prosecution. IL at 317.
321. Abrams, supra note 279, at 57; see Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1562-63; see
also Lazarus, Problem with Environmental Crime, supra note 1, at 888 (recom-
mending that "[w]orking together, the Department [of Justice] and the EPA need to
establish guidelines" regarding, among other matters, criminal sanctions). The 1971
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice recommended that prosecutors' offices develop
general policy statements to guide prosecutorial decision making. Maleng, supra note
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commentators have debated extensively the advantages and limits to
guidelines. Guidelines enable the legislature to evaluate prosecutorial
discretion;3" likewise, written policy statements offer a means to in-
crease the accountability of prosecutors.3 3 In addition, some experts
believe that guidelines result in more consistent charging as well as
declination decisions, and facilitate prioritizing of criminal cases. 24
Finally, one commentator has suggested that establishing formal over-
sight procedures over charging and dispositional decisions (in particu-
lar by documenting the factual bases for the prosecutive decisions)
may more effectively rein in prosecutorial indiscretions.325
This subpart has outlined, in broad strokes, major issues present in
the debate over prosecutorial discretion. As described, prosecutorial
autonomy raises questions about the nature and extent of internal and
external checks needed to prevent prosecutorial misconduct. The sub-
part below examines a related concern-the degree to which the fed-
eral government should centralize prosecutorial decision making in
the environmental criminal enforcement program in Main Justice.
B. Congressional and Executive Preferences Regarding the
Centralization of Prosecutorial Authority over
Federal Environmental Crimes
This subpart examines the allocation of decision-making authority
between Main Justice and the USAOs in the enforcement of federal
environmental laws. This determination presents an especially diffi-
cult policy judgment.326 The first section briefly considers models that
centralize prosecutorial authority, and the second contemplates de-
centralized systems of prosecutorial decision making. The third sec-
tion describes the interbranch controversy over this issue during the
ECS dispute. Finally, this part concludes by proposing that the DOJ
shift prosecutorial authority to USAOs gradually as they gain exper-
tise and experience in enforcing environmental laws.
1. Centralized Models
At one extreme, complete centralization minimizes the risk of
prosecutorial abuse by transferring the authority for charging deci-
sions to one locus. 327 A less extreme model requires prior approval
40, at *2. Critics, however, point out that current guidelines rarely, if ever, specify
how charging and plea bargaining discretion ought to be exercised. Vorenberg, supra
note 40, at 1545.
322. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1546.
323. Maleng, supra note 40, at 1; see Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1562.
324. Maleng, supra note 40, at 1, 2.
325. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1565.
326. Abrams, supra note 279, at 56.
327. Id. at 54. One commentator has noted, however, that this scenario merely
concentrates the risk of improper prosecutorial discretion upward in bureaucratic hi-
erarchies. See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
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before prosecutors institute charges.328 For example, the State of New
Jersey has created a centralized model for the enforcement of its envi-
ronmental protection laws." 9 New Jersey's "central command"
model has concentrated the responsibility for enforcing environmental
laws in a State Environmental Prosecutor. 3° The purported policy
rationales for doing so include maximizing the effectiveness of re-
sources devoted to enforcement efforts, and coordinating and inte-
grating enforcement in such a way as to further a comprehensive
statewide agenda.331 This centralized model is also characterized by
virtually "unfettered" discretion to coordinate all aspects of the en-
forcement of New Jersey's environmental protection model.332  Fi-
nally, centralized prosecutorial decision making also requires
"institutionalized lines of communication and protocols of opera-
tion. ' 333  Proponents of this model argue that centralizing
prosecutorial functions has replaced uncoordinated, unsuccessful ef-
forts with "[r]easoned, diligent, and effective prosecution."'
A centralized model of prosecutorial discretion, however, presents
a number of drawbacks. The ultimate decision maker will probably
not have as intimate an understanding of the facts of the case, the
available evidence, or the character of the targeted parties as a person
locally investigating and developing the criminal case.335 In addition,
centralization-and the inevitable supervision from afar-may
dampen morale at the local level by undermining the line attorneys'
sense of responsibility and investment in their work.3  Moreover,
although centralization may foster greater consistency and internal ac-
countability, discretion is not really eliminated. Rather, discretion is
simply "pushed upward, vesting [higher officials] with the power to
make unreviewable decisions about [how the law is enforced]." 337
2. Decentralized Models
The decentralized model also offers both advantages and disadvan-
tages. Undoubtedly, on the local level, prosecutors face political pres-
328. Abrams, supra note 279, at 54-55.
329. Steven J. Madonna, The Environmental Prosecutor: The Experience of a
"Central Command" Theory of Environmental Enforcement, in The Impact of Envi-
ronmental Regulations on Business Transactions and Operations 1992, at 469, 1-3
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7026, 1992-93). A state
prosecutorial system clearly does not present an ideal model for comparison with the
federal prosecutorial system. Nonetheless, despite obvious limitations, an examina-
tion of state systems offers some insights into the centralization debate.
330. Id.
331. Id. at *1, *12.
332. Madonna, supra note 329, at *2.
333. Id. at *13.
334. Id. at *12-13.
335. Abrams, supra note 279, at 56.
336. Id. at 56.
337. Vorenberg, supra note 40, at 1545.
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sures when exercising their charging discretion.338 One commentator
has argued that it is not necessarily disadvantageous for prosecutors
(for example as with publicly elected officials) to be susceptible to lo-
cal political pressures because they are forced to be more responsive
to community attitudes.339
The greatest disadvantage to a decentralized model for the federal
environmental protection program stems from the complexity of envi-
ronmental law.340 Because environmental law continually evolves,
centralized approval procedures foster more uniform federal enforce-
ment of federal environmental laws.A41 The DOJ has also adopted
centralized models for prosecutorial decision making in two other par-
ticularly complex areas of the law: enforcement of federal tax 2 and
antitrust laws.343 Given these competing advantages and drawbacks,
the next question concerns the degree to which prosecutorial author-
ity in the environmental arena should be centralized.
3. Congressional and Executive Perspectives on Centralization of
Prosecutorial Authority in the Enforcement of
Environmental Laws During the ECS
Controversy
During the ECS dispute, Representative Dingell strongly recom-
mended decentralizing prosecutorial authority and shifting decision-
making power away from Main Justice to the local USAOs.3 " Wit-
nesses invited to testify before the subcommittee expressed similar
views.345 The prosecutors offered a number of rationales for the pro-
posed policy change.
338. Mark S. Pollack, Local Prosecution of Environmental Crime, 22 Envtl. L. 1405,
1406 (1992). Local prosecution of environmental crimes presents unique issues. For
example, the prosecutor may personally know both the victim and the perpetrator. In
addition, potential defendants frequently employ citizens in the community. Most
importantly, however, the prosecutor, as a publicly elected official, is especially sus-
ceptible to local political pressures. Id.
339. Miller, supra note 42, at 10, 342. Local political pressures, thus, may more
likely compel local and state prosecutors (rather than federal prosecutors) to be ac-
countable to the public.
340. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
341. Kevin A. Gaynor, Jodi C. Remer & Thomas R. Bartman, Environmental
Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 Viii. Envtl. L.J. 1, 5-6
(1992).
342. Id. at 9-10.
343. See generally Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of
Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 192 (1993) (discussing recent
changes in DOJ policy regarding the enforcement of antitrust law).
344. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Dingell); see also id. at
117 (testimony of Richard T. Nixon, Director of the National Crime Prosecution
Center, that "[m]uch of the authority currently within the [Environment Division]
must be distributed among the U.S. Attorneys"). See supra note 159 and accompany-
ing text.
345. Id. at 100-21, 134-67 (testimony of Mr. Nixon and former U.S. Attorneys
Breckinridge L. Willcox, Dennis C. Vacco, and Robert J. Wortham).
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First, according to the testimony of a former prosecutor, the Bush
administration's "command and control policy" had dampened mo-
rale among prosecutors enforcing environmental crimes.?16 Second, a
survey revealed that environmental prosecutors believed that legal ex-
perts were exaggerating the complexity of environmental law. 347
Third, many local prosecutors had succeeded in gaining the expertise
necessary to enforce effectively environmental laws. 8 Fourth, the
trend in other law enforcement areas had been to decentralize deci-
sion making to the field,349 without sacrificing uniform application of
the law. Finally, former United States Attorney Breckinridge L.
Willcox asserted that the level of detailed review demanded by the
DOJ over ECS cases had reached unprecedented heights; the DOJ's
oversight of federal environmental criminal cases exceeded that of
even major RICO or racketeering cases.351
The Bush administration responded to its critics by arguing that all
career attorneys necessarily experience some level of supervision;352
that the criminal enforcement program required some degree of cen-
tralized prosecutorial authority in Main Justice;3 53 and that the DOJ
had traditionally vested supervisors with ultimate authority over the
prosecution of environmental cases.3-1 Admittedly, observers of fed-
eral prosecutive policy will have difficulty reconciling these two diver-
346. Id. at 103 (testimony of Mr. Nixon that "[u]nder no circumstance... should
[ECS's] leadership role be confused with the review and control that has had the
apparent effect of stifling prosecutors rather than encouraging them").
347. Id. at 114 (testimony of Mr. Nixon that "[t]here is great concern among local
prosecutors, in particular, that many attorneys attempt to complicate environmental
crime"); see also id. (testimony of Mr. Nixon that "district attorneys assert that [envi-
ronmental law] is simply another area of criminal prosecution where basic law en-
forcement and prosecution techniques should be employed").
348. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 115 (testimony of Mr. Nixon that "[o]ne very
interesting finding... was the self-sufficiency of local environmental crime prosecu-
tion units."); see also id. at 136 (testimony of Mr. Willcox that "[tlhere exists in many
U.S. attorneys' offices across the country a cadre of prosecutors experienced in the
field of environmental crimes").
349. Id at 135 (testimony of Mr. Willcox, former U.S. Attorney for the District of
Maryland).
350. Id. at 137 (stating that "no other broad area of Federal criminal enforcement
(except tax and antitrust... ) is subjected to th[e] kind of homogenization [that ECS
is]"). Mr. Wilcox distinguished enforcement of tax laws from environmental laws,
and intended to distinguish antitrust laws from environmental but did not do so at the
hearing. Mr. Willcox argued that, since the federal government applies the tax laws to
each and every taxpayer, a greater imperative exists for uniform application of federal
tax policy than for environmental law. Id. at 138.
351. Id. at 138.
352. Text of Interview with Clegg and Cartusciello, supra note 61, at *4 (noting that
tension always exists between line attorneys and their supervisors and that the DOJ
vests final decision in supervisors).
353. Id. at *5 (statement by Mr. Clegg that "[e]nvironmental criminal prosecutions
are relatively new," present "novel" issues, and require care so that "precedent and
case law" develop carefully).
354. Id at *4 (suggesting that the necessity for supervisory review of prosecutions
has support in the USAM and the Principles of Federal Prosecution).
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gent views. A number of prosecutorial models may be considered; a
dynamic model, however, which borrows from both views and is de-
scribed below, may provide a compromise solution.
In sum, centralized and decentralized models of prosecutorial dis-
cretion each offer both benefits and drawbacks. This part examined
the inherent trade-offs in the two systems, such as between autonomy
and accountability. For example, centralizing authority builds in
greater supervisory mechanisms, but does so at the expense of
USAOs's ability to take charge of and become invested in their
caseload. Moreover, centralizing prosecutive discretion also ensures
more uniformity in the application of environmental laws-and hence
greater equity for potential defendants-but disfavors developing the
expertise of local offices and tapping into regional resources and
know-how. The next part develops an analytic framework for evaluat-
ing models of prosecutorial discretion and examines four alternative
possibilities.
V. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY OVER
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
This Note concludes by recommending that the DOJ should adopt a
dynamic model of prosecutorial authority over environmental crimes.
This model accommodates legitimately motivated congressional con-
cerns and incrementally shifts prosecutive power from Main Justice to
USAOs as those offices gain the necessary expertise and experience to
enforce federal environmental laws. This part reaches this conclusion
by undertaking an analysis of the ECS dispute and (1) rearticulating
the critical problems underlying the controversy; (2) recommending
an objective that legislative and executive officials should seek to ob-
tain regarding inter- and intrabranch tensions over enforcement of en-
vironmental laws; (3) suggesting criteria to guide the analysis; (4)
evaluating the available alternatives and their trade-offs against these
criteria; and, finally, (5) offering recommendations for future
improvements.355
A. The Rearticulated Problem Underlying the ECS Controversy
At bottom, the threat of undue partisanship 356 over both congres-
sional oversight as well as prosecutorial decision making underlies the
ECS controversy. Arguably, the risk that partisan considerations dic-
tate congressional oversight of the DOJ presents a formidable inter-
ference with interbranch functioning and, in particular, with the
355. The framework for this analysis has been adapted from a model of public pol-
icy analysis developed under the auspices of the Rand Corporation. See E.S. Quade,
Analysis for Public Decisions 46-48 (3d ed. 1989) (describing the elements of analysis
as consisting of objectives, alternatives, impacts, criteria, and models).
356. The term "partisanship" here is intended in its narrow sense. See supra note
226.
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proper operation of law enforcement.3S Similarly, the threat of party-
influenced prosecutorial declination decisions-however remote-
raises a serious intrabranch concern of constitutional dimensions.
This danger of improper partisan interference in governance, in both
instances, places party interests ahead of the public interest and con-
stitutes illegitimate decision making. Such partisanship, however,
must be distinguished from legitimate political debate, which seeks ex-
pression of the public will through elected officials in the executive
and legislative branches and results in government accountability.
Elected and appointed officials should thus seek, as their overriding
objective, to conduct congressional oversight of the ECS and to exer-
cise prosecutorial authority over environmental criminal cases in a
manner that maximizes their accountability to the public and con-
strains partisan arbitrariness "in the processes of governance." 358
B. Suggested Criteria for Evaluating Models for Congressional
Oversight of and Executive Branch Exercise of
Prosecutorial Decision Making
A number of considerations emerge as paramount in evaluating rec-
ommendations for improvements to congressional oversight of and
executive branch exercise of prosecutorial decision making. The crite-
ria359 include:
(1) the efficient utilization of executive branch law enforcement re-
sources, or minimizing cost;
(2) the efficient utilization of scarce legislative branch oversight re-
sources, or minimizing cost;
(3) the effective administration of the federal environmental crimi-
nal enforcement program, or maximizing the executive branch's ca-
pability to carry out its congressional mandate;
(4) maximizing government accountability and effective (and legiti-
mate) congressional oversight over the ECS, or minimizing the
threat of undue partisanship in congressional investigations into the
federal criminal environmental arena;
(5) workability and robustness, or political and operational feasibil-
ity; and
357. See Shane, Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, supra note 82, at 462
("The more Congress's access to information about the executive branch seems sub-ject to vagaries of politics, rather than to processes of law, the greater the apparent
gap between our ideals of government accountability and the reality of government
practice."); see also id. at 496 (stating that "Congress ... likewise invites political risk
and obligates itself to discipline those members who compromise information that
should be withheld").
358. See id. at 484 (describing the "'government of laws' ideal" as emphasizing
accountability and minimizing individual caprice).
359. See Quade, supra 355, at 47 (defining a criterion as a "standard by which to
rank the [available] alternatives in the extent to which they achieve one or more
objectives" and a means by which to "relate objectives, alternatives, and impacts").
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(6) ensuring the equitable administration of environmental law en-
forcement, treating similarly situated individuals the same under the
law, or minimizing the possibility of improper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
These six criteria can thus be summarized as focusing on cost and effi-
ciency, effectiveness, feasibility, accountability, and equity.
C. Alternative Models Available for Interbranch and Intrabranch
Oversight of ECS Prosecutorial Decision Making
Broadly speaking, commentators may consider four alternative
models of interbranch and intrabranch oversight of ECS prosecutorial
decision making. The first model would centralize prosecutive author-
ity in Main Justice360 and would greatly restrict congressional probes
into ECS prosecutorial decisions (e.g., prohibit investigation into
pending criminal cases and interviews by subcommittee staff of front-
line government attorneys). The second model would also centralize
prosecutive authority in Main Justice, but would allow extensive con-
gressional oversight of ECS, including investigation of pending cases
and interviewing of line attorneys (justified by evidence demonstrat-
ing prosecutorial misconduct). The third model would decentralize
prosecutive authority and shift decision-making power to the USAOs;
additionally, this model would allow liberal congressional oversight of
the ECS's enforcement of the criminal environmental laws. Finally,
the fourth model would also decentralize prosecutorial decision mak-
ing, but would limit Congress's power to investigate the ECS's charg-
ing and declination decisions.
These four models, however, contemplate federal governance in a
highly abstract and artificial manner: for example, the models enter-
tain broad categories such as "centralization of prosecutorial author-
ity" and "liberal congressional oversight." These simplified and stark
characterizations fail to capture the subtleties and complexities inher-
ent in federal governance, especially in environmental policy and
prosecutorial practice. In truth, future analyses of disputes such as the
ECS's should undertake a more sophisticated approach and aim to
locate the center of gravity between the two antipodes-centralization
versus decentralization and liberal versus constrained congressional
oversight-rather than choosing between the two.
360. Centralization of prosecutive authority in Main Justice would probably entail
not only placing supervisory authority over all charging decisions involving environ-
mental criminal cases with the ECS, but also creating case oversight procedures
whereby the ECS would monitor cases closely-from initiation to investigation and
throughout litigation.
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D. Evaluation of the Four Models of Prosecutorial Discretion
The following subpart evaluates the four models against the six cri-
teria set out above. The analyses focus, in particular, on the trade-offs
and tensions inherent in each of the four alternatives considered.
1. Analysis of the First Model
The first model, which contemplates centralized prosecutive author-
ity and constrained congressional oversight of the ECS, would likely
conserve legislative branch resources.36' Whether this model would
be efficient regarding executive branch resources, however, presents a
more difficult question. One commentator has suggested that central-
izing prosecutive authority (at least at the state level) streamlines de-
cision making and thus saves funding.3 2 Centralizing discretion may
present serious morale problems with USAOs, however, which are ac-
customed to exercising broad discretion and enjoying substantial au-
tonomy from Main Justice.363 Thus, additional data must be collected
in order to determine the efficiency outcome of centralizing prosecu-
tion power within the executive branch.
Similarly, additional information must be collected to determine
whether this first model would advance the federal government's envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement program. While some USAOs pre-
sumably lack the expertise to prosecute federal environmental crimes
in their states effectively, others have acquired experience in this
area.3" The DOJ, through its Revised Bluesheet, appears to be aim-
ing for a flexible system that allows for the ECS to take the lead when
a USAO needs assistance and, conversely, to step back and provide
ancillary support when a USAO can undertake the case. 36
The effectiveness of a centralized prosecutorial model also depends
on the degree to which environmental law constitutes a specialized
law enforcement area, such as antitrust and tax, which warrants
greater Main Justice supervision and control? 66 Notably, observers
and federal prosecutors disagree over whether the enforcement of en-
vironmental laws presents unique prosecutorial concerns, such as un-
settled legal doctrines, highly technical statutes, constantly evolving
361. See Shimberg, supra note 57, at 218-21 (describing the expansion of congres-
sional oversight); se, eg., id. at 221 n.88 (characterizing Congress's increasing use of
police patrol oversight as "resource-intensive").
362. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
364. See Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 63-64 n.76 (noting for example
that, initially, prosecutors at USAOs-and not at the ECS-litigated criminal envi-
ronmental cases).
365. See Revised Bluesheet, supra note 201, at 3 (revised USAM § 5-11.104).
366. See Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 75 n.98 (stating that the "spe-
cialized litigation Divisions-Antitrust, Tax, and Civil Rights---exercise considerable
review authority over criminal matters within their jurisdiction").
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law, or an especially acute need for uniform application of the law.167
If environmental law does not constitute a "sensitive area," but in-
stead shares similarities with traditional criminal laws, then a central-
ized prosecutorial model would reduce the effectiveness of the DOJ's
criminal environmental enforcement program. On the other hand,
centralized prosecutorial decision making-so long as it is exercised in
a principled manner-offers defendants and targets the greatest assur-
ance that environmental laws will be enforced uniformly.
A comprehensive analysis must also consider whether centralizing
prosecutorial discretion increases the risk of illegitimate partisan in-
fluence on charging decisions. During the ECS dispute, Representa-
tive Dingell asserted that centralizing prosecution at Main Justice
increased opportunities for undue partisan compromise at the DOJ.368
Yet, if the risk of partisanship in prosecutorial decision making exists
in Washington, political appointees in local USAOs will be equally
likely to be susceptible to partisan pressures.3 69 Thus, at first glance,
the problem of politicization of charging decisions does not appear to
be simply fixed by decentralizing prosecutorial authority. In sum, cen-
tralized prosecutorial decision making-if federal environmental law
in fact presents sensitive prosecutorial issues-may or may not reduce
executive branch costs, would probably augment efficiency by vesting
control of the program in Main Justice, and would ensure a more equi-
table administration of environmental criminal law by increasing the
probability that the DOJ will prosecute similarly situated defendants
uniformly.
Most likely, restrained congressional oversight over the DOJ will
minimize the threat of illegitimate subcommittee investigations into
the ECS. Moreover, such tempered congressional conduct will suit
constituents who support the executive branch's environmental poli-
cies, but alienate those constituents who desire that Congress act as a
watchdog over the DOJ and the EPA. Thus, if the DOJ's or the
EPA's credibility has been tarnished by scandal, restraint may be per-
ceived as an abdication of Congress's constitutional oversight func-
tion. In short, restricted congressional oversight will likely preserve
legislative resources, prevent disruptive intrusion into the smooth
367. Compare Corcoran, Internal Review, supra note 6, at 46-47 (casting federal
environmental statutes as special and describing them as "pos[ing] enormous inter-
pretive difficulties" and "pos[ing] special enforcement problems with respect to uni-
form application of the law") with Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 114 (witness
suggesting that attorneys unnecessarily exaggerate the complexity of environmental
law and that prosecutors believe enforcement of environmental laws can occur as with
any other area of criminal prosecution).
368. Hearing 1993, supra note 4, at 208 (Rep. Dingell referring to the problem of
the "perception that centralizing decision-making on environmental cases in Washing-
ton, D.C., opens the door to special preference, influence peddling, and invites the use
of pressures and special privilege ... on behalf of the rich and powerful").
369. 1d at 208 (testimony by former Assoc. Att'y Gen. Hubbell that "political pres-
sure is [not] limited to Washington, D.C.").
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working of law enforcement, and protect targets from unfair public
scrutiny. On the other hand, reining in congressional subcommittees
may leave the executive branch open to unchecked prosecutorial
abuses. In conclusion, this first model offers potential benefits in effi-
ciency and the uniform application of the law, but may present a
drawback in unnecessarily restraining Congress-resulting in Con-
gress's shirking its constitutional duties to oversee the Executive and
reducing its accountability to constituents.
2. Analysis of the Second Model
The second model would also centralize prosecutive authority in
Main Justice, but would allow extensive congressional oversight of
ECS. Thus, the analysis conducted above regarding centralization
would also apply to this scenario.370 Expansive congressional investi-
gation into the ECS, however, could result in stifling law enforcement
efforts37 1 and expenditures of tremendous resources. Moreover, if
subcommittee oversight becomes adversarial and antagonistic, such
activities could virtually paralyze an executive branch unit, as it did in
the ECS's case. Thus, unrestrained congressional investigation of
prosecutorial discretion could waste limited government efforts both
in the legislative and in the executive branches, and hamper environ-
mental protection effectiveness. 372 In sum, adoption of liberal con-
gressional oversight of the DOJ would likely create high costs and
reduce the effectiveness of executive branch efforts.
Regarding government accountability, liberal congressional over-
sight-so long as it is principled (for better or worse)-makes the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches more responsive to the electorate. As
the ECS dispute demonstrated, however, party-motivated considera-
tions pose a great threat in subcommittee investigations. The more
expansive the scope of congressional oversight activities, the greater
the risk that an undisciplined representative could further party inter-
ests at the expense of law enforcement goals. Moreover, as discussed
previously, congressional scrutiny into the DOJ poses serious obsta-
cles to the fair and effective administration of law enforcement. 3
This second model, however, presents a benefit of greater government
accountability (if representatives conduct principled investigations).
In sum, although the cost effectiveness of centralizing prosecutorial
authority remains uncertain, liberalizing congressional oversight Vill
probably escalate the costs of subcommittee investigations. In addi-
370. See supra notes 361-69 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
372. On the other hand, if congressional subcommittees selectively investigate
prosecutorial decisions-supported by ample evidence warranting the inquiry-then
their probe could both uncover prosecutorial misfeasance within the DOJ as well as
act as a deterrence to such impropriety.
373. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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tion, expanded congressional probes into the DOJ, while augmenting
accountability, may not only jeopardize individual targets' civil liber-
ties, but may also undermine law enforcement efforts. Thus, this sec-
ond model offers a trade-off between efficiency, equity, and
effectiveness on the one hand and greater government accountability
on the other.
3. Analysis of the Third Model
The third model would decentralize prosecutive authority and shift
decision-making power to the USAOs, while also permitting extensive
congressional oversight of the ECS's prosecutive discretion. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of liberal congressional investigation into
DOJ, which applied to the second model, also apply to this third
model. Thus, the third model would likely increase legislative costs,
disturb law enforcement efforts, and create a greater risk that defend-
ants do not receive uniform treatment. These disadvantages, how-
ever, must be balanced against increased government accountability
and the potential efficiency gains brought about by decentralizing de-
cision making, by investing USAOs with the authority to carry out
cases, and perhaps by reducing bureaucratic oversight.
4. Analysis of Fourth Model
Finally, the fourth model would decentralize prosecutorial decision
making, but would limit Congress's power to investigate the ECS's
charging and declination decisions. Such an approach would favor
USAOs' control over and investment in criminal environmental en-
forcement above Main Justice's close supervision in the environmen-
tal criminal enforcement arena. As noted previously, determining the
cost effectiveness of decentralization cannot be ascertained without
gathering additional data and determining whether environmental law
constitutes, in fact, a specialized area of the law similar to antitrust
and tax. Given the foregoing analysis, this fourth model would likely
generate uncertain costs, reduce government accountability, and hin-
der the uniform application of the law.
5. Recommended Dynamic Model
As environmental law continues to evolve and local USAOs gain
expertise, policymakers will calibrate appropriate levels of centralized
prosecutive discretion with great difficulty. Moreover, policymakers
unlikely will predict accurately the effect of expanded or restrained
congressional oversight on centralized versus decentralized systems of
prosecutive authority. Nonetheless, legislative and executive officials
must engage in these sophisticated analyses.
To that end, the recommended dynamic model requires that gov-
ernment officials consider such varied factors as the region in which
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the local USAOs reside and the particular federal statute being en-
forced. Policymakers-in Congress and at Main Justice-must moni-
tor continuously the degree to which USAOs (and their state and local
counterparts) gain competency in environmental enforcement. In ad-
dition, policymakers should consider ways in which the integrity of
charging decisions can be best protected: correspondingly, DOJ and
congressional officials must identify the weak spots that make prose-
cutors and representatives most susceptible to undue partisan
pressures.
As the analyses above demonstrates, a tripartite system of govern-
ment contains built-in tensions such as between autonomy and ac-
countability. Moreover, efficiency can only be gained at the expense
of effectiveness; and, the uniform application of laws can only be at-
tained by centralizing prosecutive authority and limiting congressional
oversight. As both branches seek to minimize the threat of partisan-
ship in both congressional monitoring of DOJ and DOJ's exercise of
prosecutorial decision making, they must continually attempt to strike
a balance between competing goals and accommodate the built-in ten-
sions. This Note recommends a dynamic approach to the congres-
sional oversight as well as executive branch exercise of prosecutorial
discretion over federal environmental crimes. This approach envi-
sions gradual increases in prosecutive authority by USAOs as they de-
velop greater expertise and allows principled legislative oversight of
law enforcement when warranted.
CONCLUSION
As this Note describes, understanding the maelstrom surrounding
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the ECS requires an exami-
nation of the historical and legal contexts of the dispute. Environ-
mental law is a new field with developing doctrines; environmental
criminal law is an even newer field with unsettled prosecutorial crite-
ria. Given the long-standing historical antagonism between Congress
and the Executive, as well as partisan divisions over the EPA's envi-
ronmental protection program, this rancor has inevitably spilled over
to the DOJ as Congress has criminalized the federal environmental
laws.
The institutional, political, and legal forces that create this dynamic
overwhelmed past ECS officials. Nonetheless, the DOJ can take steps
to ameliorate the situation. Clearly, Attorney General Reno's deci-
sion to decentralize case procedures has appeased many critics. A
great many practitioners, however, still worry about the degree to
which and the manner in which Congress can properly oversee the
enforcement of the federal environmental protection program. More-
over, Attorney General Reno still needs to implement managerial re-
forms and take steps to improve coordination between the EPA and
USAOs.
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The DOJ should develop policy statements that elaborate on
prosecutorial criteria regarding the enforcement of environmental
crimes. Although guidelines can be revised to be more detailed and
can be further developed with input from USAOs and the regulated
community, they cannot be considered the beginning and end of con-
trols on prosecutorial improprieties. Similarly, legislative oversight
over the DOJ has a necessary place so long as it is not so intrusive that
it compromises law enforcement strategies unnecessarily or unfairly
maligns prospective defendants.
The principled and ethical exercise of prosecutorial discretion is of
paramount importance to the healthy governance of our democracy.
Even in the complex and evolving arena of environmental criminal
enforcement, external controls from the legislature can supplement
vigorous internal checks to ensure that the executive branch enforces
both the spirit and the letter of the environmental law. Such accom-
modation can most likely be attained through a dynamic model that
grants gradual prosecutive authority to USAOs as they gain expertise
and allows disciplined congressional oversight of law enforcement
when warranted.
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